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ABSTRACT 
This work is a study of postmodernism that attempts to understand the 
concept by analysing its comparative context. Defining my frame of reference 
was no easy task, and I deal equally with phenomena that have been labelled 
postmodern and those that have not but still fit into the wider picture that I 
explore. In a work like this it is important to take a wider view and understand 
not just the spikes of activity that demand attention but also the 
circumstances within which they occur and the norms on which they are 
founded. 
One of my key concerns is how postmodernism can be understood 
historically as well as circumstantially. I explore at length the similarity 
between the political theory and philosophy of the sophists, a group of 
presocratic thinkers whose concerns centred around relativistic scepticism, 
and postmodern theorists. I am interested in comparing the two groups of 
thinkers not only because if they are similar postmodernism can be 
understood in historical terms, but also because if they exhibit differences 
these differences help us to clarify the nature of postmodernism. My analysis 
includes an examination of the intellectual and socio-political backgrounds of 
both groups of thinkers, and leans toward understanding the theories as 
normal and natural rather than truly radical or revolutionary. 
Postmodernism resists conventional analysis and is something that perhaps 
cannot be understood holistically: certainly not from the modern perspective. 
It may not have a central 'truth' to understand or a limit to its reach but if we 
are to make any sense of It, we must study the individual whys and 
wherefores of postmodernism. Ultimately I do not believe that 
postmodernism is something radical or alien, existing somehow outside of the 
social order, and I have attempted to show this through rational grounded 
argument in this work. 
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How things are 
It has taken me twelve months to research and write this dissertation and in 
that time I have been asked two questions innumerable times. Interested 
parties, ranging from friends and family, to fellow academics and polite 
acquaintances have asked me these questions, and I have had trouble 
answering them every time. The questions that I am talking about are, of 
course, "what are you studying" and "why"? 
The first question may be difficult to answer well, but the second is even 
harder. This study is about understanding our world, and what we treat as 
normal and mundane within a historical, political and intellectual context. It 
will not serve to cure cancer or prevent war and my studies will not give me 
access to any ultimate truth but that does not mean that it is impractical or 
worthless. The point of this work (the "why") is to help those who read it to 
understand the meaning behind postmodernism: the twenty-first century's 
most important 'ism' and the seemingly universal answer to the question that 
no one asked. My usual response when people ask me what I am studying is 
something along the lines of "postmodernism and where it fits in with 
everything we think we know", but more than that, this work is about trying to 
get its audience inside the skin of a notoriously elusive concept by examining 
its content and context. We are apparently surrounded by indicators of this 
being the postmodern age so we should be concerned with what role our 
epoch plays in the metanarrative of human history and where we might be 
going (socio-politically speaking). We should also be rigorous about 
grounding any such investigation so as to guard against generality or 
speculative futurology. 
My approach has been to find a point of comparison in our history and to use 
this to problematize the concept that postmodernity is a uniquely temporally 
and geographically (or equally intellectually and socially) situated 
phenomenon. The mindset that we think of as unique to our age is actually, I 
believe, more base an understanding than we tend to realise. The 
understanding itself might even be considered a defence mechanism, to 
protect us from certain intellectual and material trends though the strength of 
this argument depends on how one sees the relationship between political 
theory and reality - a concern of the latter part of this work. In essence, what 
my work explores is the notion that postmodernism is not necessarily 'post'-
(meaning after or following on from) modern at all, or that if it is, then perhaps 
the 'modern' in question is not strictly the contemporary era. The reason that 
I have looked to history as a point of comparison is quite simply because it is 
the only point of comparison that can be used. What else can the philosophy 
of a global epoch be compared to on this earth? 
Analysis through history does have its merits and its flaws. One such aspect 
of this double-edged sword is the apparent certainty with which we can deal 
with a historical event or trend. We treat history as immutable and 
unchanging but this is not true, at best history is resistant to change. As our 
understandings of the past change, either because the current cultural climate 
or set of norms has changed, or because further insights into the past (such 
as lost works) are revealed, effectively the past as we know it does change. 
We talk of historical facts when actually we mean our current, and often 
biased opinions of what might have been. We can only view history through 
memory or records and how can these ever be treated as wholly accurate? 
Of course this doubt can just as easily extend to commentaries on the 
contemporary since perspective is a significant issue when writing about ones 
own time. The benefit of using our imperfect understanding of a period of 
history and treating it as a counterpoint to how we see the present is that it 
gives us a chance to highlight the difference between the two and analyse 
why they are as they are. This particular piece of analytical work can indeed 
only be done using history, because a wealth of facts about and commentary 
on our past exists, providing a foundation for understanding, whilst the 
present can only ever be a maelstrom of opinion and information without 
clarity or resolution, because we can never know how things will turn out. 
I have used history as my 'other' to explore the 'self of the present because 
only by looking at the face of someone else can one build a frame of 
reference to describe one's own reflection. The question is, where have I 
looked to find this history and why? The answer is that I went as far back as I 
could. Although this work could have compared and contrasted 
postmodernist thinkers with any political theorists that the world has ever 
known, I wanted to go to the source of our understanding: Ancient Greece. It 
is a falsehood to claim that there was no such thing as political philosophy 
before the 5"^  Century BC, but there is a reason that Socrates is recognised 
by most as the Father of Philosophy and that is because of circumstance. 
Greece may not still be the empire that she once was, but her culture, 
technology and ideas were absorbed into Europe's foundations at its earliest 
stage of unification. Furthermore, writings still exist from this era both due to 
the technology and sophistication (or perhaps rather the sophisticated division 
of labour) that the Ancient Greek civilisation achieved, enabling it to produce 
a wealth of professional intellectuals. 
Plato may be the source of much written historical evidence but he was not 
the subject, rather his mentor Socrates and his opponents, the sophists, 
were. Socrates and the sophists exist at the far reach of our historical 
records and our intellectual understandings and yet the ideas first attributed 
to, and argued about by them are still fundamental ones today. Why then 
base my comparisons on the sophists rather than Socrates? Quite simply, 
because history paints them as the losers of the argument and their ideas 
became the Dionysian side of the canon of Western political philosophy still 
opposed to the Socratic starting point that over time evolved into the 
foundation of high modernity. I believe that, largely unconsciously, 
postmodern thinkers have adopted and incorporated into their work the 
understandings and arguments of the sophists and the question is simply 
about how fundamental or coincidental and convenient these ideas are. 
There are of course dangers with what I have chosen to do. For a start the 
sophists did not produce much work that still exists today, so much of what 
they said has made it to these pages only second or third hand at best, and 
from fragments that may have been misinterpreted or taken out of their 
intended context. Even if I had original texts to work from rather than biased 
or inaccurate commentaries, there still exist translation problems that are 
barriers to effective communication. The sophists theorised In Ancient Greek 
which presents a double barrier to my understanding: the language and, more 
importantly, the geo-historical contextual norms that are two and a half 
thousand years plus roughly the same number of kilometres, outside of my 
frame of understanding. A criticism that could be levelled at my methodology 
is that I picked the sophists as a point of comparison because of my own 
history studying them - they were the focus of some of my undergraduate 
studies. I have to accept that this criticism may have a point, like the theory I 
will explore I am something of a slave to my circumstances, however does my 
personal interest in these thinkers take anything away from them as a point of 
reference? Does the fact that I am interested in the core fragments of their 
ideas that I do understand mean that there is no point in making an intelligent 
analytical comparison, or worse yet, invalidate the similarities or differences I 
uncover? I don't think that it does, and I don't think that any potential 
criticisms are significant enough to stop me using the attributed source for 
relativist and sceptical ideas, to perform an analysis of the philosophy that 
presupposes these ideas to justify its importance in the contemporary world. 
Over the course of this work I will expand my model of understanding and 
frame a basic theory. I will use my theory to explain what postmodernism is, 
where it has come from and where it might be going. The clear focus of this 
work is postmodernism, and the weighting of my attention to all of the subject 
matter covered (including analysis of the sophists with whom I compare 
postmodern thinkers) reflects this. I do not intend the theory to be 
prescriptive, and the finished product will not represent an accurate prediction 
or a formula for action. What it will serve as is an example of how theory and 
reality interact, and towards the end of the work this will be one of my 
principal concerns. Theory in isolation is meaningless and I am concerned 
with context and effect when I talk about the role of postmodern (or any other) 
theory. Taking a moment to be self reflexive, the context of this work is a tiny 
fragment of the analysis that has gone into the postmodern problem, and the 
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effect will, I hope, be to shed the smallest pinprick of light on one dimension 
of this field. Why contribute to a field when I have only been able to read a 
fraction of the literature pertaining to it? Because I want to add my name to 
the distinguished list of thinkers who have taken a shot in the dark and tried to 
explain our understanding of the human condition: how things are. 
How this work is 
The starting point for my study is to take a look at what postmodernism really 
is but I will then cover two distinct areas: firstly how postmodernism can be 
understood compared to sophistry (as already mentioned in this introduction), 
and secondly how postmodernism can be understood in the context of the 
contemporary world that shapes it and is shaped by it. The first half of the 
work is important for understanding the second half and by the time I start 
dealing with the more abstract questions to do with how theory and reality are 
intertinked, I want my reader to understand enough about postmodernism and 
where it comes from for it to be an example and a point of reference. The 
exploration of the key ideas and manifestations of postmodernism had to 
come first for me because it is the most important part, the foundation for 
everything that follows. In chapter one I will clarify terms of reference - who 
and what I am talking about and what the core ideas of postmodernism are. I 
aim to impart an initial understanding of the central concept, free from bias 
and un-clouded by comparison or heavy analysis. As I will explain later, logoi 
(unique conceptual understandings) cannot be transferred, bilocated or 
cloned, but I will attempt to evoke my understanding of postmodernism in the 
reader. 
After the first chapter frames a basic understanding of postmodernism in the 
readers mind, the second will move away from it entirely and on to the 
sophists. I vyiH explain the background to their theorising, the specifics of their 
ideas and the general conclusions that history leads us to believe they drew. 
As already mentioned in this section I am using the sophists because I see 
their ideas as remarkably similar to those of certain postmodernist thinkers 
and I want to explore why this might be the case, but also I think that 
understanding a historic theory with the benefits of hindsight and centuries of 
study is useful for getting a handle on the political philosophy that pen/ades 
our society. You may start to see the similarities that I will draw even before 
the end of this chapter and because of this I launch straight into an analytical 
comparison of postmodernism and sophistry with my third chapter. The 
comparison I make is something that I hope will differentiate my work from the 
many existing works that are more reasoned and detailed equivalents of my 
first two chapters. I cannot claim complete originality of course since there 
are others who have seen the same potential link as myself. Professor 
Stephen Hicks, for instance, claims that, "Postmodernists are not original. 
The irrational seldom are. Postmodernists are rewarmed Sophists from 
Ancient Greece of 2400 years ago."^ None the less I feel that the comparison 
and how I handle it has worth and is an appropriate lynchpin of my work and 
a good foundation for the more ethereal concerns of the second half of this 
work. 
Having detailed the similarities of postmodern and sophistic theory in chapter 
three I use chapter four to present some alternatives. There are undoubtedly 
many sources from which postmodern ideas have been drawn. Chapter four 
looks at intellectual inspirations for postmodernism and chapter five looks at 
practical socio-political inspirations. Both of these chapters further explain 
postmodernism by detailing important aspects of its context and examining 
certain instances of it in more depth. They also lead on to chapter six which 
revisits my comparison of the sophists and postmodernists but focuses this 
time on how similar the circumstances (intellectual and material) of the two 
ages are. I believe there are historic similarities that led to the build up of 
relativist theory in the ancient and modern worlds. These similarities are 
found in the contexts that the relativists engaged with. In simple terms, the 
worlds of these thinkers share certain traits that I believed made the 
production of the resulting theories inevitable, regardless of specific individual 
' Hicks, Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault (Tempe: 
Scholargy Publishing, 2004), p. 182 
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theorists. Chapter six will focus showing a link between the circumstances 
that supported sophistry and postmodernism, according to the notion that the 
similarity of the theories is more than just coincidental. The alternatives that I 
see are that either postmodernism has mimicked sophistry (which is a 
possibility given founding postmodernist thinkers like Nietzsche were also 
avid historians, and the general propensity for 20"^  Century thinkers to recycle 
intellectual property both seriously and irreverently) or that similar times have 
produced similar theories. 
While researching chapter six, chapter seven really wrote itself, and from 
there on I move away from my core comparison somewhat and engage in 
what seems like an intellectual domino effect. My concern arising from 
comparing Ancient Greece and the modern world in order to prove or 
disprove a similarity of social circumstance is as follows: what difference does 
social circumstance make to political theorising and the intellectual pursuit of 
high philosophy? More simply put, what is the relationship between political 
reality and political theory? Chapters seven, eight and nine all follow on from 
this as I deal with firstly the relationship between globalisation and 
postmodernism (questioning if globalising pressures led to the birth of the 
postmodern mindset) then the relationship between any theory and its reality, 
before finally I come to rest on the core concern that inspired this dissertation: 
what effect does postmodernism have on the world around us and what effect 
might it go on to have? 
Overall this structure is rather like a roller coaster: it warms up by defining its 
terms, detailing postmodernism and the tool of comparison to be used 
(sophistry) then in chapter three there is the first little rush as the comparison 
is made proper and revelations about postmodernism whistle past us. After 
this there is another uphill slope where context for further comparison, this 
time of circumstances, is detailed and a picture is painted allowing for chapter 
six to speed downhill again throwing out ideas as it goes. From chapter six 
onwards, the second half of the ride does not slow down, it follows a line of 
questions (do circumstances shape theory, what then is the point of theory, 
can theory affect reality, what effect does postmodern theory have on the 
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world around us and what effect will it continue to have in the future as part of 
the wider historic picture?). These questions are the corkscrews and loops of 
the ride and each one leaves us breathless. At the end of the ride we look 
back and marvel at how much we have covered and how seamlessly the 
different thrills of the ride fitted together. 
My goal is a lofty one: I want to define one of the most elusive concepts in 
contemporary politics and then show the method behind a theory that rejects 
method as we understand it. I hope to evoke the same understanding in my 
audience that I believe to be true without reference to any universal truths and 
without the crutch of empirical evidence. I plan to link a number of complex 
concepts, any of which I could focus this entire dissertation on without 
necessarily saying anything new or of worth. Perhaps hardest of all I want to 
try and keep this study grounded in reality and academically rigorous. I want 
this work to be worth something and yet I am ignorant as to what worth really 
is, and fully aware that there is probably no such thing as true worth because 
no thinker in human history has ever fully disproved the relativist concept that 
man is the measure of all things. 
The hypothesis that a year ago I took to my supervisor when I started 
planning this work, was that globalization is a catalyst for postmodern 
theorising, which itself is not unprecedented. I believed that moral relativism 
and fragmentation are the way that Western cultures deal with the pressures 
of having become part of an international or global community, which involves 
sharing space and consciousness with 'the other'. Space-time compression 
has removed the distance from the self-other relationship, and this has had 
an impact on the collective psyche of communities, resulting in the doubting 
theory that in the contemporary world we term postmodernism (but in the 5"^  
Century BC was termed sophistry). Along the course of studying this, my 
interests have evolved, particularly to the inclusion of some general musings 
about the role of political theory. I invite you to join me in experiencing the 
intellectual journey that I have taken. 
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POSTMODERNISM 
This chapter will define and discuss the postmodern. I will begin by 
considering some general statements about the nature of postmodernism and 
I will support these with reference to associated core texts. The discussion 
will not be confined to the original formulations of Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard 
and other archetypal thinkers, as I believe that postmodernity is exhibited in 
many ways and places which are all important to consider. My aim here is to 
provide a framework for understanding postmodernism so that I might later 
comment on its origins, implications and role. 
Defining postmodernism 
Georg Simmel claimed that 'Defining Postmodernism is like trying to catch a 
fish in your hands', and it Is one of the few things about postmodernism that is 
not debated or disputed. Some call postmodernism a phenomenon, whilst 
others label it a condition, a theory, an ideology, a movement, a moment, a 
mindset or even a paradox. This issue of terminology reveals how confused 
academic thought is on what postmodernism, or the postmodern, actually is 
and the confusion is not something that I am aiming to solve even if that goal 
was accomplishable. What I do intend to do is explore some of the facets of, 
and issues connected to postmodernity and theorise about how temporally 
and spatially unique 'the postmodern' is, and in order to do that I need a 
working definition. 
Popular understandings of postmodernism are confused at best, but the 
impression that exists is that it is a mindset that asks questions. A few 
definitions that I uncovered in the briefest of internet searches show how it is 
understood to be a method of analysis that rejects convention. According to 
one dictionary, the postmodern is: 
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A loose body of thought/criticism which holds that all knowledge processes are richly 
informed by personal aims and cultural world-views. All knowledge processes, 
including modern scientific theories, are constructed in and for a given socio-cultural 
life world; thus social theory may best be seen as a subjective narrative or text which 
legitimates existing or desired social relationships.^ 
And according to another, postmodernism is: 
A philosophical concept that allows the perceiver to perform analysis on any given 
text without the presupposition of boundaries, limits, or structures. In essence, 
postmodernism assumes hypertextual mediums which are inherently fragmented in 
nature. Simply, this mode of thought is a rejection of modernist structuralism. Instead 
of determining absolute truth, postmodernism seeks to achieve relative coherence.^ 
Put more simply, postmodernists understand that: 
Social and cultural reality, as well as social science itself, is a human construction.'* 
What all of these definitions share is an understanding that postmodernism 
rejects the rules of modernity and questions why things are as they are. In 
essence, the plural discourse of postmodernism challenges the rigid 
homogenisation of modern society. Put more simply, postmodernism works 
to provide alternatives to the hegemony of modernity and it seeks to reverse 
the trend of narrowing down options in society to the one most rational choice 
- the phenomenon of Macdonaldization that is a hallmark of modernity.^ 
A more comprehensive definition is offered in a text-book that I have found 
very helpful throughout this study. Lawrence Cahoone claims in his 
introduction that. 
Five prominent postmodern themes can be distinguishes; four are objects of its 
criticism, and one constitutes its positive method. Postmodernism typically criticises: 
presence or presentation (versus representation and construction), origin (versus 
^ [http://www.public.iastate.edu/~rmazur/dictionarv/p.html1 19/04/04 
^ rhttp://hvper.vcsun.oro/HvperNews/battias/get/coms633/f200l/pomodel74.html?nogifs1 19/04/04 
'* [oregonstate.edu/dept/anthropologv/glossarv2.htm1 19/04/04 
^ Ritzer, The Macdonaldization Thesis: Extensions and Explorations (London: Sage, 1998) 
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phenomena), unity (versus plurality), and transcendence of norms (versus their 
immanence). It typically offers an analysis of phenomenon through constitutive 
otherness.^ 
What Cahoone is claiming is that firstly postmodernism rejects the immediate 
presence (existence) of objects independent of symbolism. Secondly it 
rejects the idea of finding a deeper meaning behind phenomena based on 
original circumstances: what an author intended is irrelevant to what a text 
means because dealing with more than the superficial becomes guesswork 
rather than analysis. No analysis can be complete or final because 
everything is constituted in infinite relations. This leads on to the third point, 
which is that postmodernism rejects the idea of a single integral existence or 
concept because we can never fully understand how all of existence interacts. 
Even an individual is not a unity and is better understood as a multiplicity of 
forces: many selves rather than one self. The final rejection of 
postmodernism is the idea that norms are transcendent or universally 
valuable. Ideas such as truth and justice are not independent of the process 
that they supposedly serve to govern and are indeed a product of that 
process. The critical analysis of postmodernism problematizes all normative 
claims, including those made by postmodernists, the same way that it 
problematizes prime (immediate surface) meaning, the concept of deeper 
meaning and the idea of a singular meaning. Cahoone's final claim is that an 
object or self exists only in the absence of, or more accurately in the presence 
of and obsen/able contrasting difference to, an 'other'. Basically, a thing only 
makes sense if it is not something else - which is an old but still fascinating 
idea.'' 
Even this definition fails to reveal the depth or colour of the postmodern 
picture. In order to fill in some more of that picture I will discuss some of the 
issues relating to the practice of postmodernism, its politics and the effect that 
they have had on the tangible structures of society, but first I must pay heed 
to the words of those attributed with founding (or perhaps rather discovering) 
* Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism: an Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 
1996), p. 14 
^ Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism 
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this mindset. I turn now to the work of the original postmodernists whose 
ideas are framed in the setting of 1960s France. 
Claude Levi-Strauss developed the concept of structural anthropology and 
initiated the intellectual trend known as structuralism by drawing on the prolific 
reading he did in the fields of geology, law philosophy and linguistics. 
Perhaps his most prominent influence was the Swiss professor of linguistics 
Ferdinand de Saussure who focussed not on the meaning of words but on the 
patterns that they formed. Levi-Straus developed this idea and tried to 
provide an insight into how the human mind understands anything. He 
claimed that, "Man passes from a natural to a cultural state as he uses 
language, learns to cook, etc... Structuralism considers that in the passage 
from natural to cultural, man obeys laws he does not invent it's a mechanism 
of the human b r a i n . T h e implication of this understanding is to view man not 
as a privileged inhabitant of the universe, but as a transient species that 
adheres to universal laws and structures. Universalism governs the 
structures of human thought and consequently the conduct of human activity 
according to this understanding, and this allowed Levi-Strauss and the 
structuralists who followed him, to inductively generalise about the structures 
of all human societies. 
Structuralism, as framed by Levi-Strauss and developed by Georges 
Canguilhem, Michel Serres, Louis Althusser, Jaques Lacan and Ronald 
Barthes, conflicted with the conventionalist position of Jean-Paul Satre. Satre 
had understood our way of categorizing the world as unique, and drawing off 
the works of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, those who followed Levi-Strauss laid 
into this understanding's unsubstantiated claims about the centrality of 
subject with unsubstantiated claims of their own. I feel that this opened up 
structuralism itself to criticisms for being too general, because it really did no 
better at proving its understanding to be true than did the theory it sought to 
replace. Criticism came from those who disagreed with such a universal and 
unsubstantiated theory, appealing to paragon principals behind structures, 
Schmitt, 'Claude Levi-Strauss' (1999) 
[http://www.mnsu.edu/emuseum/information/biographv/klmno/levi-strauss claude.htmll 12/07/04 
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and the champion of such criticism of the structuralist position was Michel 
Foulcault. Poststructuralism was the immediate forerunner to postmodernism 
and it served to pioneer some of the deconstructionist ideas at the heart of 
postmodernism. Structuralism was seen to have failed to sustain its claim to 
provide objective scientific knowledge because it focussed too much on 
removing the perspective of the subject from science, and not enough on 
empirical adequacy.^ 
The importance of understanding structuralism for this study is that it leads to 
an understanding of what followed it. Gutting writes that, 
Poststructuralism combines the structuralist style of objective, technical, and even 
formal discourse about the human world with a rejection of the structuralist claim \ha\ 
there is any deep or final truth that such discourse can discover. The 
poststructuralist project need not be self-contradictory, but it is inevitably ironic, since 
it sees its method of analysis as both necessary and, given traditional goals, doomed 
to failure.^" 
The similarity with postmodernism is clear and that is because the one 
evolved out of the other. Postmodernism took up the torch of fundamentally 
challenging the core intellectual ideals of philosophy that had existed since 
Plato, based on the intellectual path-beating work done by the 
poststructuralists. Foucault and Derrida are perhaps best seen as bridging 
this academic distinction, as they applied their radical project of questioning 
the ideal of ultimate knowledge to general philosophy as well as the prior 
concerns of phenomenological and structural inquiry. 
Foucault and Derrida were concerned with deconstructing the concept of 
order as is shown by the former thinker's work on madness in Folie et 
deraison (1961) and the latter thinkers concept of difference. Perhaps though 
the final emergence of postmodern thinking is best credited to Jean-Franciois 
Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Luce Irigaray who worked to produce extensive 
studies of 'the differend', difference and sexual differences respectively, A 
^ Gutting, 'The Structuralist Invasion', in, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
'° Gutting, 'The Structuralist Invasion', in, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p.250 
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thesis could be written solely upon how postmodern each of the five thinkers 
mentioned in this paragraph are, since the lines of definition are blurred at 
best. Perhaps it is not even important which among them we should label as 
the first postmodernist since together, their work forms the starting point from 
which postmodernism has blossomed. They framed the focus of the field by 
concerning themselves with the unconventional and the abnormal, studying 
them for the sake of understanding our concept of the standard, rather than to 
reveal the kind of universal truths that their predecessors had sought but 
which they themselves rejected. 
Already I have been unfaithful to the idea of postmodernism by labelling it so 
simplistically and unanimously and by trying to pin an original postmodern 
theorist to it. Every theorist who talks about or critiques postmodernism has a 
different idea of what it actually is. Some argue that postmodernism is a 
myth, some claim that it is over stated and some see it everywhere they look. 
Every theorist constructs their own postmodernism none of which are more 
universally correct than any others because all understandings of 
postmodernism are unique fictions based on interpretation.^^ There is no true 
postmodernism or higher postmodernist that all postmodern theories 
resemble in a Platonic sense, and there is barely even a core principle that 
holds the movement together. Acceptance of this is central to what I 
understand the postmodern to be: a relativist framework for understanding. 
According to postmodern tenets, there is no single true postmodernism, there 
are not even guidelines that distinguish a postmodern method. On the other 
hand, the postmodern movement is something that I believe exists in 
verifiable terms and it exists because its members share certain beliefs, the 
unifying elements of theory that are the essence of postmodernism. 
Fundamentally, postmodernism is the rejection of generalizations (a 
sentiment only legitimated by the internally reflexive and irreverent nature of 
postmodernism). It is a discourse that reconsiders the obvious in light of the 
possibility that assumed fundamentals are mutable or non-existent. Because 
" Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London & New York: Routledge, 1989) 
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of its individual and speculative nature, no two theorists will necessarily (or 
even probably) employ the same exact method or reach the same exact 
conclusions about any issue. A good example of this is the differing opinions 
of two prestigious postmodernist thinkers of the1970s and 80s, Jean-Francois 
Lyotard and Daniel Bell, about the nature of postmodernism itself. Lyotard 
claimed that postmodernism was all about 'incredulity toward metanarrative'^^ 
and Bell claimed that it was the rejection of bourgeois empirical rational 
pragmatism^^. These definitions take different approaches to the subject 
matter; the first more philosophically and sociologically oriented than the 
second, a more practical and political definition, but what they share is an 
inclination towards the same postmodern purpose or essence. 
Postmodernism in context 
One thing that all understandings about postmodernism do share is a 
realization that postmodernism cannot exist on its own. An isolated instance 
of postmodernism cannot exist because at its core the theory is critical and 
reactionary. A good analogy for understanding this is the assertion that 
postmodernism is a parasitic facet of modernity. By nature, it feeds on the 
dissatisfaction that modernity breeds as a by-product of rationalization (a 
dissatisfaction that Weber links to the iron cage of bureaucracy that modernity 
creates) and reacts against it.^ "* The understanding of a postmodern epoch 
that comes, as the name suggests, after modernity is a little misleading, as for 
postmodernity to be maintained, there must also still be modernity. A better 
understanding, which this essay will utilise, is that postmodernism is an 
aspect of modernity that is both important in its own right, and part of a wider 
socio-political picture. 
In practical terms (as exhibited by grassroots political movements) 
postmodernists are minorities in our society that can affect only minor social 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984) 
Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976) 
Heller and Feher, The Postmodern Political Condition (Padstow: Polity Press, 1988) 
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changes. They cannot change the system or engage in mass politics 
because when they gain enough power to influence the mainstream they 
become part of it. Postmodernism can never succeed the status quo 
because if it engages in the business of changing society it will itself change. 
Equally, there will always be a critical (discontent) element of society so 
postmodernism will never truly die out. If everything that opposes modernity 
is postmodern then as long as an instance of modernity exists, so will a 
proportional instance of postmodernity. Best and Kellner make an interesting 
point when explaining the purpose of postmodern political movements: they 
claim that. 
Without systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the 
margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, 
aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately 
co-opted by the culture industries. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, 
and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted 
and perverted. 
This recognition of the limitations of applied postmodernism Is important, and 
when talking about the politics of postmodernity, one must recognise its 
subjectivity and fragility. Postmodern political movements are perhaps not 
capable of changing the world but more importantly, the transformation of 
society as a whole does not fall within their remit, it is not their concern. 
It is at least possible that the business of postmodernism is not to cause the 
collapse of the modern world but rather to reinforce the status quo; something 
that it does in two ways. Firstly postmodernism extends liberalism to its 
natural end and is the inevitable result of the proliferation of free market 
ideology and entrepreneurialism. The children of the 1980s have polluted 
every aspect of civil society with their individualist-consumerist outlook, which 
can at times seem like liberalism gone crazy, but which still fundamentally 
attends to the ideology behind modernity and legitimates the modern wortd 
accordingly. Secondly, and perhaps even more convincingly, postmodernism 
" Best and Kellner, Dawns, Twilights, and Transitions: Postmodern Theories, Politics, and Challenges 
[http://www.democracvnature.orK/dn/vol7/best kellner poslmodernism.html 28/06/04 
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divides opposition to modernity, fulfilling (deliberately or othenwise) a role 
similar to that of socialism during the Cold War period. It acts as an 
intermediary measure between capitalism and something else, between the 
conservative and the radical, whose impact is to dilute revolutionary spirit 
rather than mustering it. It promises gradual change even when revolution 
might be the only real way of changing things, and thus plays a role in 
maintaining the status quo. One step further down this line of analysis might 
be to consider this role as deliberate: postmodern sentiments and activities 
could perhaps be a pressure valve that plays a role in the self perpetuation of 
the machinery of modernity. 
The understanding of postmodern structural motivations that I most favour is 
that penned by Heller and Feher, who claim that postmodernism is neither 
revolutionary nor conservative but exists outside of predefined politics. They 
see pluralist cultural relativism as the product of a disillusioned 'alienation 
generation' who did not conform to the norms that would allow political 
categorization in the left-right spectrum or any other traditional measure. 
The problem with this theory being correct is that it implies that 
postmodernism is apolitical, something that clearly is not the case: the 
business of postmodernism is to offer political choice and reallocate public 
attention. My solution to this dilemma is to understand that problems finding 
a label for political trends and movements, that I consider postmodern, are 
the fault of the labelling system. How can a system founded on the assumed 
norms of contemporary society evaluate a theory that is reacting against that 
society and finding alternatives to that which is taken for granted? 
I do not believe that postmodernism is a unifying resistance theory; instead, 
as I understand it, it actually coexists with the structures of modernity rather 
than trying to reinforce or overthrow them. A possible reason for this 
coexistence is that postmodemism is born of modernity and feeds off it, 
unable to remain viable on its own. An alternative to this option is perhaps 
Heller and Feher, The Postmodern Political Condition 
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that as a theory, postmodernism simply does not incite action at all. Boggs 
claims that. 
Despite its critical and oppositional language, postmodernism is actually system-
reproducing in its celebration of fragmented, localized, and (occasionally) private 
discourses; it fits the imperatives of corporate colonization, partly because, in its 
extreme formulations, it gives rise to a disempowering nihilism. 
What he believes is that postmodernism is an intellectual and cultural reaction 
(or perhaps more accurately a spectrum of reactions) to the collapse of 
established ideological paradigms. The effect on society of this collapse is a 
disbelief that ideologies can be politically implemented and this results in the 
fragmentation of the macro realm of politics. 
When the macro realm of politics fails us, the focus of politics shifts to 
encompass less traditionally political issues such as identity as a mechanism 
of change, and issues that were formerly considered part of the private 
sphere become public. The political arena becomes public property but it is 
not used for anything more than administration by the disenchanted and 
disempowered. Fundamental changes to human life rise up from the informal 
organization of individuals with shared interests - imagined communities and 
new social movements - and political theory is reincarnated in a form 
appropriate to the time. Politics changes according to our needs, and even a 
nihilistic postmodernism cannot kill anything more than the contemporary 
form that it takes: every interchange of power is a political transaction, and for 
society to function 'politics' as we understand it must change. The reason 
that it always adapts rather that ever being replaced is best explained by 
Lyotard who claims that, "everything is politics" in the sense that "politics is 
the possibility of the differend on the occasion of the slightest linkage."^^ I feel 
that this understanding is well supported by the observable change to the 
remits of public and private spheres in the last half century. That important 
social issues now include domestic violence, child abuse and binge drinking 
" Boggs, The End of Politics: corporate power and the decline of the public sphere (New York & 
London: The Guildford Press, 2000), p. 221 
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is telling of how private and personal matters of the past have become more 
obviously political. 
Contemporarv postmodernism 
Boggs is not alone in recognising that postmodernism means the 
fragmentation of traditional structures. Lyotard, Foucault and Butler, to name 
just a few, all agree that postmodernism is a rejection of normative power 
relationships and the assumed way of, and reason for, doing things. 
Postmodernism and poststructuralism go hand in hand, they are products of 
the same circumstance and have the same goals: to undermine the 
ideological and methodological assumptions of modernity. That said, they are 
not the same thing and postmodernism can coexist with some fairly 
fundamental structures of modernity - indeed it has to if it is to exist at all in 
the modern world. 
Whilst on a micro-sociological level postmodern pluralism has caused 
fragmentation, the corporate system remains s t a b l e . T h i s might lead a 
theorist to claim that postmodernism is all talk, and the phenomenon 
associated with it, namely new social movements, are of little importance 
because they do not effect the economic foundations of society (the base in 
Marxian terms). I disagree with this assertion and believe that it is not 
possible to categorise postmodernism as a purely social phenomenon 
because of the way that the social, political and economic spheres are 
intrinsically linked. Relativist pluralism affects politics as is observable in the 
conception of contemporary phenomenon such as identity politics and post-
materialism. The effects of new ways of thinking on the wider macro-
economic picture are more subtle, but none the less the impact of cottage 
industries, alternative forms and goals of entrepreneurialism and demands for 
alternative work conditions (such as holiday purchase options) lobbied for not 
by unions, but negotiated by individuals, are of growing importance. 
" Boggs, The End of Politics 
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The actual political effects of new social movements (the social 
manifestations of postmodernism) are wide and varied. This in a way 
represents the nature of the postmodern 'mixed bag' or 'anything goes' 
attitude but is also a good indicator of the reaction of wider society towards 
the shake-up theory. One example of a social movement that has enjoyed 
high levels of political success is the women's movement, which has been 
able to work within and without the existing institution for change. Feminist 
theory now often employs aspects of the postmodern in looking at the 
alternatives to the patriarchal system, drawing from fundamental philosophies 
and the structural and gender-norms that are found in other cultures. 
Postmodern relativism, critical deconstruction techniques and interpretive 
identity based politics can be strong allies of feminism. That said however, 
the women's movement made some of its most significant gains during the 
early modern era and has a lot to thank rationalization for. Also, the women's 
movement has arguably been more divided than aided by postmodernism as 
feminists argue amongst themselves about the various merits of 'equal' 
versus 'different' (postmodernism having introduced the concept that women 
could be gauged on a different scale to men rather than being measured as 
inferior or superior to them). 
Mary Gergen states in the abstract to her article Facing Off: 
Postmodern/Feminism, that "While postmodernism invites us to engage in 
continual dismantling of the grand narratives of progress and 'the good', other 
feminists hold to an evaluative foundation in their analysis of societal 
positionings."^° This quote expresses well the fears of conventional feminists 
who see their achievements as being undermined by the restructuring of 
value that postmodernists seek to achieve. In essence feminists, and other 
marginal groups, who have worked hard to make significant political gains 
now stand to lose something: they will inevitably suffer internal strife because 
they are changing from being revolutionary to conservative. Worse yet for 
such groups, their members are changing their personal objectives at 
Gergen, Facing Off: Postmodern/Feminism 
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different rates, pulling the organizations in different directions and leading to 
fragmentation. In the case of feminism, whilst progressives like Fine and 
Gordon suggest we should, "understand gender as a relational concept full of 
power and possibilities; ... we need to disrupt prevailing notions of what is 
inevitable, what is natural, and what is impossible. We need, therefore, to 
invent and publish images of what is not now, and what could be"^\ this is not 
a universally embraced approach and theorists like Margo Culley see it as 
more than ironic that as women and ethnic minorities have become strong, 
the concepts on which their strength is founded are attacked. 
The effect of postmodernism on feminism has been more than simply to 
cause conflict. As my case study, feminism shows how even as the 
destructive wave of postmodern criticism breaks upon a subject, it contributes 
to it, and leaves a novel fusion of ideas in its wake. Christine Di Stefano 
claimed that the power of feminism stemmed from modernism because of its 
emphasis on gender. Stark prejudices and inequalities between men and 
women made resistance possible, however the light of postmodernism lays 
bare the generalisation inherent in this argument. Women are different by 
several factors, such as class, race, and cultural background: postmodern 
feminists must account for specifics. To a postmodern feminist, any 
methodology of abstraction is meaningless: instead the personal experiences 
of women, no matter how diverse, have needed to be embraced. Mary Joe 
Frug is accredited with providing a valid function of the postmodern critique 
with her claims that, "discourse should be recognized as a site of political 
struggle" and "sex difference has a semiotic character which is constituted by 
systems of signs that we produce and interpret, although the meaning of 
gender is undeterminable or undecidable."^^ To my mind, the influence of 
postmodernism on this movement could not be clearer. 
'^ Fine & Gordon, 'Effacing the centre and the margins: Life at the intersection of psychology and 
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Interest groups now enjoy a great deal of political success, and just looking at 
the influence that they have over British or American public policy reveals 
how extensive and integral macro-political fragmentation is within 
contemporary society. Representation has been extended across the board 
and although it is not necessarily equal, it is available to all (within material 
constraints). Every identity has become represented and this leads to 
problems since clearly opposed identities will clash on the political 
battleground and in the postmodern era consensus is often not embraced due 
to the diminished value of conclusions. 
Lyotard's [postmodern] politics is a politics of endless conflict and protest, with 
seemingly no possibility of constructive agreement - one might even say no 
possibility of politics at all.^'' 
A good practical example of this is the situation in the United States when two 
of the polar interest groups clash, for instance when the pro-life and pro-
choice movements get involved with a piece of legislation. Often the input of 
single-issue groups who see continued battle as preferable to a compromise 
can slow down the legislative process and lead to ever shifting laws, based 
on viability, which are emphatically pragmatic and inherently confused.^^ 
From the Lyotard perspective, all consensuses are bad, whilst all variation is 
good making meaningful politics impossible. 
In the name of diversity postmodernism has enabled the creation of a number 
of interesting groups that tackle issues from a new (though not necessarily an 
original) perspective. A good example of this is the political revival of the 
Religious Right in the United States, particularly as linked to the issue of 
abortion. The New Right and the Christian Right grew up alongside the issue 
and both represent a rather postmodern backlash against liberalism. The 
former was a response to the liberal consensus or the 1950s and 60s, which 
combined libertarianism and traditionalism to justify capitalist order on moral 
grounds. The latter also arose in reaction to the liberal consensus and based 
*^ Adams & Dyson, Fifty Major Political Thinkers: Jean-Francois Lyotard (London & New York: 
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its policy on opposing the erosion of traditional religious morality that the 
liberal consensus had caused. The Religious Right advocated a return to 
family values and a post materialist moral outlook.^^ 
The postmodern definition 
One must marvel at the contradictions that exist within postmodernism. On a 
practical level, both groups that encourage liberal free choice and highly 
restrictive and traditional movements are born of the same understanding. 
From an intellectual standpoint as well as a political one, postmodernism 
seems weakened by being so broad as to encompass such extremes. 
Furthermore, postmodernism seems to fundamentally undermine itself by 
being a progressive metanarrative, every bit the 'grand theory' that modernity 
is at the same time as it rejects that concept. This however is what makes 
postmodernism unique. 
Postmodern politics is something new and interesting. It is difficult to pin 
down because it seems simultaneously to encompass a great deal and to 
barely exist. When I talk about postmodern philosophy in this essay I will 
usually mean the rejection of grand theory and the diversification of ideas and 
options. When I refer to postmodern politics I will usually be talking about the 
new forms that politics is adopting: identity politics and the activities of interest 
or issue groups within the contemporary political arena. It is difficult to be 
precise when dealing with the postmodern because the terms used are 
limited only by their application within the bounds of the discussion. An 
absolute definition is, according to postmodern semantics, inherently 
impossible. 
For me, postmodernism is centred around rejecting generalizations, simplistic 
explanations and assumed knowledge. Over arching theories that explain 
everything are not useful to this critical discipline. To be a postmodernist one 
Durham, The Christian Right, the Far Right and the Boundaries of American Conservatism 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 
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must deal in specific terms and rely on intuitive understanding rather than 
culturally implanted assumptions or reference to scientific fact. 'Truth' does 
not exist independent of the conclusions we draw and the beliefs we 
(deliberately or othenwise) impress upon others. Postmodernism treads a fine 
line between being meaninglessly self indulgent, concerned with every word 
to the point where the sentence and sentiment are lost, and being unfaithful to 
itself by falling into the pitfall of modernity. To understand some aspects of 
postmodernism, one must simply be content to accept them. 
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S O P H I S T R Y 
Whilst it is true that postmodernism is a theory drawn from a multitude of 
other theories, I believe that one particular theory is most closely associated 
with it. This section of my thesis will attempt to show that a great deal of the 
methodology and theoretical content of postmodernity is actually quite pre-
modern in origin. The way that this will be done is by looking at the (pre-) 
philosophy of the sophists, a group of intellectuals and educators in the 5*"^  
Century BC. First I intend to clarify the theorists that this essay is concerned 
with and set the intellectual scene for their theorising, then I will detail their 
approach and conclusions. Astute readers will realise that my detailing of 
sophistry in this chapter is a good deal more methodical than my treatment of 
postmodernism in the last, and this I account for in two ways. Firstly, the 
subject matter of this chapter has been dealt with by many secondary sources 
since the time of the sophists, and opinions about them have settled and 
become established. I hope to use some of this established understanding 
for my own analysis, and so I have attempted to remain faithful to it here. The 
second reason for the two chapters seeming stylistically different is that I 
found when researching and writing the last chapter, the form that it took was 
influenced by some features of the subject matter. My hope is that by utilising 
the clarity of history I will present here, we will better be able to understand 
the nuances of postmodernism that the maelstrom of the present hides from 
our sight. 
Talking about 'the sophists' is about as unclear as talking about 'the 
postmodernists' because they were not a school in the conventional sense 
and simply shared some understandings about how to address important 
issues of their time (issues which I believe are in fact timeless). They were all 
professional educators who considered philosophical, political and social 
issues from a pragmatic, relativist viewpoint. The specific individuals who I 
am most concerned with and to whom I will be referring when I mention the 
sophists, are Protagoras of Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Thrasymachus of 
Chalcedon and Callicles of Athens, though there were many more individuals 
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who shared their understanding of the world and even added to the wealth of 
sophistic theory that has now been largely forgotten. For the general purpose 
of this essay I am taking the dates of the sophists to be between circa 450 
and 380 BC. 
The intellectual context of the sophists 
What was distinctive about the theory of the sophists was that it rejected the 
optimistic pre-science of the Ionian thinkers of the 6"^  Century BC (Thales, 
Anaximander and Anaximenes, all of Miletus, and Heraclitus of Ephesus 
specifically). These early scientists made, 'the first really rational attempts to 
describe the nature of the world'^'' utilising what would later become known as 
the framework of idealism, but their attempts had flaws which the sophists 
helped to reveal. Thales and his contemporaries retro-engineered their 
understandings of the world to theorise about the logos, a universal account 
or truth, and they introduced the concept of cosmic order or natural law. 
According to Aristotle, 
Most of the original seekers of knowledge recognised only first principles of the 
material kind as the first principles of all things. For that out of which all existing 
things are formed - from which they originally come into existence and into which 
they are finally destroyed - whose substance persists while changing its qualities, 
this, they say, is the element and first principle of all things.^® 
Reductionist presocratic science led Thales to claim that water was the 
quintessential substance of the universe since it was needed for growth. 
Although this supposed deduction was arguably influenced by Babylonian 
and Egyptian creation myths and only comes to us now through fragments 
reported on by Aristotle, it still seems to be the first justified atheistic account 
of how the world was formed of this era. 
Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers 2'"' Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Others followed Thales in trying to frame an understanding of the wortd's 
origin and in doing practical scientific work. Anaximander concluded that 
apeiron, the limitless or infinite, was the balance between all states of matter 
and it was from this that everything else formed. It was a mixture of 
opposites, never clearly defined, which might indicate that he thought all 
stuffs of the universe could change into one another making it wrong to 
prioritise any one above the others. He also is credited with drawing the first 
map of the world and possibly inventing the gnomon, a time measuring 
device, though again there is evidence that this was borrowed from 
Babylonia.^^ Anaximenes took a different view and asserted that air 
condensed or refracted into everything else on the basis that the universe 
represented a large scale version of the human body. "Just as in us, he says, 
soul, which is air, holds us together, so the whole universe is surrounded by 
wind and air."^° 
Heraclitus was perhaps the last significant Milesian, and he theorised that fire 
was the archetypal state of matter. He also concerned himself with 'the 
logos', which was something that the wise man can listen to in order to know. 
Heraclitus reasoned that although the world was always in a state of flux, a 
single, consistent, divine law existed beneath this flux - an idea that has 
persisted and was exhibited in the thought of Plato and much Christian 
thought that was (and still is) influenced by Ancient Greek ideas. What all of 
the theories of the Milesian scientific philosophers shared was the fact that 
they were based entirely on the beliefs of the theorist and lacked proper 
scientific falsifiability. They were positive constructive ideas, but there was no 
good reason why one was right and the others were wrong; a problem 
considering the mutually exclusive nature of their 'truths'. 
Parmenides of Elea represented a turning point in the history of philosophy 
and it was his ideas that paved the way for intellectual scepticism and 
sophistry. The break that he represented from tradition is best represented 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers trans. Hicks (London: Heinemann, 1925) 
Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., ed. Kranz, 6"" edition (Zurich: Weidmann, 1951-2) 
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by Eudemus of Rhodes' claim that, "Parmenides would not agree with 
anything unless it seemed necessary, whereas his predecessors used to 
come up with unsubstantiated assertions."^^ Parmenides famously exposed 
the contradictions within the science of the Milesians and pointed out the 
difference between truth and moral opinion. He challenged their explanations 
of the nature of the world by looking for proof, and found that all the Ionian 
thinkers could offer was opinion, rather than fact or truth.^^ Parmenides went 
on to distinguish between the way of truth and the way of appearance: he 
claimed that over reliance on common sense and physical sensations 
confused our understanding of the nature of existence and, following this 
logic, he concluded that empirical enquiry was impossible and that 
experimentation could not reveal truth. The only thing that we can say, 
according to this logic, is that 'the world is'. 
Zeno of Elea followed up on what Parmenides started when he conceived of 
the paradox; a device designed to disprove common sense and show that 
what people may observe in the physical world is not necessarily logically 
possible. His paradoxes call into question not only sensory perception, but 
also our communal understanding of reality (what Durkheim would later label 
as an aspect of society's Conscience Collective^^). Essentially, Parmenides 
and Zeno painted philosophy into a corner and left a legacy of doubt in their 
wake. The people of Ancient Athens were losing faith in their gods but they 
had also just had their sciences disproved. Robin Waterfield, in his 
introduction to this era, defines the relationship between the sophists and 
their world very well I feel: 
it might seem puzzling to say that the Sophists were the heirs of the Presocratics, 
since at first glance the two groups seem to be divided, not united by their interests... 
The Sophists were more interested in language, in all aspects of logos, than they 
were in the nature and origin of the world. However the Sophists were the immediate 
heirs of the Presocratic scientific revolution in the sense that, once the Presocratics 
had made the world at least potentially comprehensible to the human mind, a 
Diets, Die Fragmente der Vorsokmtiker, 28A28 (Eudemus in Simplicius, Commentarv on Aristotle's 
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humanist or anthropocentric emphasis on the importance of human beings was 
inevitable. The Sophists were the first seriously to raise questions in moral, social, 
and political philosophy.^'' 
The political theory of the sophists 
The sophists theorised against this backdrop of doubt and chose to reject the 
"progress" made by the thinkers who came before them. They were highly 
sceptical of presocratic science and of the structures of understanding that it 
produced. Like postmodern thinkers, they questioned the natural and obvious 
and produced a radically different understanding of how men should behave. 
Central to this understanding was the concept of moral relativism: the idea 
that if all that we have is doxa, belief or opinion, we cannot act with certainty 
and individuals must therefore make moral choices without absolute 
guidelines to use as a compass. This led Protagoras of Abdera to assert that 
"man is the measure of all things - of the things that are, that they are; of 
things that are not, that they are not."^^ 
Protagoras was the master sophist, and despite Plato's low opinion of him, he 
was probably one of the best and most important presocratic philosophers. 
He believed firmly in democracy and claimed that he taught people to be 
good citizens by enabling them to better make rational arguments. His critics 
dispute this and claim that he simply taught the art of making the weaker 
argument defeat the stronger, but what they did not question was the fact that 
he was a political and philosophical relativist without reserve, as is 
exemplified by this excerpt from his writings. 
If the wind is blowing on me and on you, and it appears warm to me but cold to you, 
then it is really hot for me and cold for you... it is true both that the wind is hot and 
that the wind is cold. Similarly, moral truths depend on the outlook of a given society. 
We (Greeks) know that kijiing an innocent person is wrong, since it is prohibited by 
the conventions of our society. But it is equally true that killing an innocent person is 
34 Waterfield, The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists (Oxford: Oxford University 
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right, if it conforms to tlie appearances of some other society. Truth and reality 
depend on convention.^® 
Although a postmodern theorist would phrase it differently, Protagoras' 
sentiment of cultural relativity would not be all that alien to them. Judith Butler 
is a theorist who has spent most of her career claiming that the prohibitive 
conventions of Western culture regarding certain behaviours (generally 
toward women) do not mean that they are "wrong". She claims that gender is 
not biologically fixed but is performative; a fabricated set of acts and gestures 
that become their own ontology and produce an effect of a deeper self. 
Gendered identity is performed, and each performance reinforces social 
norms, legitimising and making mundane artificial gender norms: in other 
words, making gender assumptions true through manipulation of 
convention.^'' Protagoras' claim that truth and reality depend on convention is 
an important part of twenty-first century politics both in theoretical and 
practical terms, and the idea is fundamental to postmodernism. 
The text Dissoi Logoi, - Contrasting Arguments - backs up Protagoras' 
argument and is a key work for understanding the relativism of the sophists. 
It points out the differences between the standards of the Lacedaemonians 
and the lonians and explains them as culturally relative. The text gives us an 
insight into the cultural realisations of the time, which were undoubtedly the 
result of Athens' changing global circumstances. I will discuss these 
circumstances in greater detail in another chapter, but for now what is 
important is to emphasise that Protagoras understood the nature of cultural 
diversity and used it to generate a theory of more general relativity -
relativism of reality as well as convention and morality.^^ True relativism as 
was pioneered by Protagoras treats activity as good or bad depending upon 
circumstance but more than this it treats objects as one thing or another 
depending on circumstance with no objective or true nature. 
Irwin, Classical Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.96 
" Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 1990) 
Wong, 'Relativism', in, Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1993) 
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The second sophist I am interested in, Gorgias of Leontini, was more of a 
rhetorician than an intellectual whose ideas were generally in agreement with 
Protagoras' political theory. He spread sophist theory far and wide using 
novel and dynamic delivery but most importantly, he is credited with the 
invention of Paradoxologica; the technique of devising a message that refutes 
itself. He used this rhetorical device to show up the problems with 
philosophical reasoning, just as postmodern theorists like Foucault use 
linguistic analysis to dispute normalised meaning. Most famously Gorgias 
explained very clearly that he could never explain anything and his ability to 
do this (particularly when giving speeches) won him great acclaim to the 
extent that among Thessians, 'to orate' acquired the name 'to gorgiaise'.^^ 
On What Is Not was Gorgias' seminal work and it was in this text that he 
asserted that there is no truth, that even if there was truth it would be 
unknowable and that even if there was truth and it was known it would not be 
communicable because we cannot understand or express truth without 
impressing ourselves onto it. He further claimed that since logoi (loosely 
translated as understandings in this context) are unique and cannot be 
transferred, bilocated or cloned communication is made logically impossible 
because the best anyone could ever do is evoke a similar idea in another to 
the one that they themselves hold.'*° Although it is possible to read On What 
Is Not, 'straight' treating Gorgias as an honestly deluded Parmenidean 
philosopher, it seems more likely that he was constructing an intellectual 
pitfall. Quite possibly, the model for On What Is Not was Zeno's paradoxes 
and he was trying to create a similar reductiones ad absurdum given the 
standing philosophical assumptions. Gorgias used a philosophical 'joke' to 
reveal an important problem within metaphysical theorising: that it relies on 
fundamental assumed beliefs and not some universal truth.'*^ 
Buchheim, Gorgias von Leontini, Reden, Fragmente und Testimonien, herausgegeben mit 
Ubersetzung und Kommentar (Wambmg, 1989), test.35 
""^  Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias. Plato and their Successors (London: Routledge, 1996) 
Waterfield, The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists (Oxford: Oxford University 
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The final conclusion of sophistry 
Protagoras and Gorgias are remembered by history as fairly mild, 
conservative orators and teachers, content with using rhetoric to live within 
the preconceived political systems, but not all of their followers could be 
described this way. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Callicles of Athens 
extended sophist assumptions to their logical limits and as such, we know 
them as 'the radical sophists'. At this point I will just re-state that the sophists 
were not a school and that what they share is a very general understanding of 
the world based upon their shared profession and status as 'wise men'. The 
radical sophists had some ideas which are less easily associated with those 
produced by postmodern theorists, however their ideas were a development 
of those of their teachers and emergent aspects of postmodernity may yet 
utilize these ideas. The practical adoption of the ideas of Shoppenhauer and 
Nietzsche by the Nazis is one example of how radical relativist ideas have 
been practiced once already in the twentieth century. Given the volatility of 
postmodernism and the contemporary world, not much is beyond the realms 
of possibility when it comes to what, and how, old ideas can recur. 
Thrasymachus reasoned that if there were no universal morality (and no 
natural sanctions), there was no reason that individuals should not use their 
talents to their advantage. He was highly critical of convention and viewed it 
as simply the will of the strong imposed on the rest. He thought that only a 
fool would willingly conform to the norms of Greek culture and be a 'just' man 
because, "In any and every situation, a moral person is worse off than an 
immoral one""^^. He further asserted both that 'Justice is merely the 
advantage of the stronger party' and that 'Justice is another's good' according 
to Plato's Republic, although it should be noted at this juncture that the work 
is highly critical of Thrasymachus and does not treat his ideas fairly. The first 
claim, that justice is the advantage of the stronger party, is a legal positivist 
one, assuming justice to be relative to human institutions (as Protagoras 
claimed it was). The second claim, that justice is another's good, is what 
Plato, Republic, trans. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 343d 
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Annas calls 'immoralist', as it assumes that objective justice exists, but 
recognises that acting justly means acting against a person's best interests.'*^ 
If this was a claim that the real Thrasymachus made then he can be credited 
with taking sophistry to the next level of scepticism though he does rather 
depart from the fundamental idea that we cannot know anything if his 
philosophy is sincere and the statement is not just a rhetorical trick. 
Callicles follows on from the immoralism of Thrasymachus and claims that the 
pursuit of one's own interests, whilst being the best course of action, is not 
unjust, but rather it is natural justice. Plato's Callicles states that, 
Other creatures show, as do human communities and nations, that right has been 
determined as follows: the superior person shall dominate the inferior person and 
have more than him... These people [the superior or stronger ones] act, surely, in 
conformity with the natural essence of right and, yes, I'd even go so far as to say that 
they act in conformity with natural law, even though they presumably contravene 
man-made laws."" 
Convention and nature are invariably opposed and the rules made up by 
groups of humans favour the weak who constitute the majority of the species. 
They are framed so as to make the natural activities of strong people 
shameful. In The Gorgias, Callicles claims that, it is disabling shame rather 
than logic that allows Socrates to defeat Polus earlier in the argument and he 
asserts that an interlocutor strong and confident enough to brazen it out could 
not be refuted by the elenchus.'^^ The doctrine that Callicles asserts is that 
"might is right", and it is a powerful example of sophistic rhetoric but also a 
reminder that the ideas of the sophists were not limited to their own time. 
Callicles' idea was echoed by Nietzsche in the nineteenth century and has 
become part of Western popular culture since then - it is one of the few 
philosophical sentiments that is almost universally understood. 
Understanding relativism and the context that gave rise to it is the key to 
understanding the sophists. They were reacting against a culture of doubt 
"^  Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 
''*' Plato, Gorgias, trans. Irwin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 482d 
Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric 
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and finding a new way to understand the world around them. More than that, 
the sophists influenced the wortd that they were a part of through their 
criticisms of it and by teaching influential young men how to succeed in a 
wortd without truth and consequently without moral constraints. The key 
features of sophistry are a rejection of theones that rely on flawed or 
insubstantial evidence, a concern with specifics and detail and a generally 
critical cynical approach founded on the idea that all truth is relative and no 
evidence available to us can dispute that. I hope that by now, the reason for 
companng these individuals with postmodern thinkers is clear. 
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TWO THEORIES COMPARED 
In this chapter I will explore in greater depth some similarities between the 
theorising of the sophists and postmodern philosophers. My starting point will 
be to clarify the similarities that I have obsen/ed and in the following chapters 
I will go on to analyse the reasons behind these similarities, both intellectual 
and circumstantial. Sophistic theory has not been mindlessly parroted by 
postmodern theorists, and in places there are significant differences between 
the understandings: the radical sophists for instance recognised some form of 
natural law, a metanarrative, and they appear less postmodern because of 
this. Considering the fragmented nature of both sophistic and postmodern 
theory, it is not surprising that the various thinkers I am considering conflict at 
times. In fact this is unimportant, since the approach that the sophists and 
postmodernists share to asking and answering fundamental questions is the 
link that I am most interested in investigating. 
The question 
The question that these two groups of theorists separated by two and a half 
millennia address, is one fundamental to the conduct of human affairs. They 
ask why things should be as they are, and what makes them similar (other 
than the fact that they ask it at all) is that they reject the notion that this 
question can be answered. All encompassing solutions are discredited, 
conventional understandings are rejected, references to symbols are 
disallowed and empirical formulations are revealed as a philosophical fallacy 
because of the un-provability of the foundations of science. What this leads 
to is a situation where even finding the linguistic tools to pose the question is 
a feat, and providing an answer that can be proved and communicated is 
impossible. Consequently, individuals must resort to belief in ideas and, 
since all ideas are inherently of equal value, 'anything goes': a state known as 
epistemological nihilism. Bronner claims about postmodern understanding 
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that, "contingency is seen as undermining every philosophical foundation'"*^ 
but his comment could be applied equally well to sophist understandings. 
That is why I have chosen to compare these theonsts so starkly. 
From these premises one can say that since all we have is belief, there are 
no such things as natural laws. Instead, everything that we understand to be 
true, fundamental things such as physical laws and transient things like 
human laws, are founded in convention rather than nature. The sophists' 
notion that this was true, that nomas was what held society together rather 
than physis, was disputed and temporanly dispelled by Plato but it has 
resurfaced in the work of postmodernists. Linda Hutcheon writes that, 
The postmodern's initial concern is to de-naturalize some of the dominant features of 
our way of life; to point out that those entities that we unthinkingly experience as 
'natural' (they might even include capitalism, patriarchy, liberal humanism) are in fact 
'cultural'; made by us, not given to us. Even nature, postmodernists might point out, 
doesn't grow on trees."*^ 
Garry Gutting, when writing about the beliefs of Lyotard, explains further that. 
There are no independent criteria on the basis of which we can judge ethical 
prescriptions to be valid or not... The absence of determinate judgement means, of 
course, that ethical decision lies in the realm of desire, figure, the event, the 
differend."' 
It is important to understand that the basis of relativism for both the sophists 
and postmodern theorists is rooted in questioning assumptions. For this to 
develop into full blown relativism however requires the questioner to not only 
deny any answers that are given to his questions, but also to deny that his 
questions can be answered at all. What separates Plato from the sophists is 
the fact that he did not present a pure critical theory, but rather he tried to 
Bronner, Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), 
p.238 
Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), p.2 
Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p.329 
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answer the questions that his teacher Socrates asked. Plato presumed to 
know best in a way that the relativists, who are my concern here, never did. 
The specifics 
There are several specific theoretical similarities between postmodernism and 
sophistry that I would just like to clarify at this juncture. Some of these I have 
already commented on and some I will come to comment on later, but I feel 
this round up is necessary as it best shows why have highlighted the sophists 
as important tools for understanding postmodernism. 
First and foremost both groups of thinkers rejected conventional wisdom even 
so far as to throw out scientific proofs of truth based on the flawed nature of 
empirical (deductive) reasoning. A sceptical approach to 'what is' is essential 
when thinking as either a sophist or a postmodernist. Of course they are not 
the only groups of thinkers to have utilised such a negative approach to 
understanding - the Hellenistic Sceptics for instance, especially Pyrrho, held 
that things were indifferent, immeasurable and indefinite and that the only 
available course of action was the suspension of judgement that leads to 
tranquillity, ataraxia^^ - but the similarity is significant regardless. Destructive 
critical relativism is used as a tool for both groups of thinkers to make their 
entrances and show the comparative worth of what they have to offer. The 
applied use of critical relativism is the task of bringing down unsupportable 
theories. For the sophists, undermining the pre-science of the Milesians was 
proof that their activity had worth, as much as any activity can have worth 
within a moral void, as they were serving themselves rather than constructing 
an untenable metanarrative. For postmodernism, critiquing aspects of the 
broad (and often ignorant) hegemony of modernity provides a platform from 
which to build a counter culture. 
Sharpies, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, an introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1996) 
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The terms differ, but the sentiments behind sophistic and postmodern attacks 
on convention are similar even so far as to employ shared imagery. Sophists 
and postmodernists alike reject the metaphor of the river, whose turbulent 
surface hides relentless undercurrents, because they oppose the idea of a 
deeper meaning behind the observable activity of individuals. If a hidden 
significance or universal truth exists behind every apparently free action, then 
it is not something that we have access to, just as we cannot see the 
undercurrents in a fast flowing river. There are some concerns that are 
apparently unique to each era, the sophists for instance did not focus on the 
importance of defining the self through its relationships and issues such as 
identity were not on their agenda. Even here though, a similarity persists 
because in understanding the polls, the sophists made reference to other 
cultures, showing us how the self-other relationship did play a part in their 
formulations. 
The fifth century BC and the end of the twentieth century were both periods of 
elevated general scepticism, stemming apparently from a periodic theological 
decline. The forms for communication (of new ideas and othenwise) particular 
to these periods were notably relativistic: I refer of course to the 'birth of 
rhetoric' in the Ancient World, and the growth of the 'culture of spin' in 
contemporary times. 
Applying this 
Understanding that answers cannot be yielded by any means accessible to us 
is one thing that many theorists have shared throughout history but these 
same theorists have not all agreed on what this means in practical terms. 
Pure plurality, choice above all else, is only a theory, and its application is 
where politics becomes involved. Politically, the sophists are shown to us by 
Plato as using their skills with rhetoric to become wealthy and influential 
through teaching their charges about the workings of power. Though it is 
biased, his account shows that because they saw every idea as relative, the 
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sophists taught how to make political gains by convincing others of the (false) 
value of ideas that benefited oneself over others. 
From our current perspective theorists like Lyotard and Foulcault are not seen 
as corrupters of those who study them, teaching people how to be systematic 
manipulators of belief for their own personal gain. This could be because of a 
lack of opportunity in the modern world due to structural safeguards that now 
exist, or some sort of natural intellectual resistance we have developed. 
Perhaps, it could be because our morality has evolved past the point where 
our short sightedness might lead us to use philosophy the way we once did 
(though observation of the world around us seems not to lend strength to this 
idea). Alternatively, perhaps we are blind to the way that students of the 
postmodern abuse the modern world either because we are too close to our 
subject to observe it objectively or because we tend to look in the wrong 
place. Evidence of such abuse is found in the political philosophy of Hitler's 
National Socialism for instance. Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs claimed 
that Nazi ideology and practice was derived from the philosophy of Jacobi, 
Hamann, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Scheler, 
Jaspers, and Heidegger. He claims that these philosophers attacked reason, 
all promoted irrationality, and hence they all prepared the way for Hitler. 
Although this ideologically biased interpretation is perhaps more indicative of 
the poverty of marxist philosophy under Stalin, it does still contain more than 
just a grain of truth regarding the source of Nazi ideology.^" 
We believe that postmodern theorists engage in dialectic rather than rhetoric, 
revealing the truth through an impartial means that benefits all parties rather 
than the self-serving and self-promoting argument used by the sophists. That 
said are we truly so naive as to assume that these theorists are not pursuing 
their own personal agendas? It is not exclusively intellectual altruism that 
leads to theorists forming postmodern pearts of wisdom. The motivations for 
forming novel political theory are grounded in material needs for the research 
grants that only go to theorists who find something new to say, and in human 
* Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason, trans. Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1980) 
43 
needs such as the ego boosts that fame or professional respect can provide. 
Furthermore, postmodern theorists produce nothing of material worth and 
make a living by selling their ideas: an activity that a bitter young man whose 
mentor had just been executed by the state might well lash out at in critical 
terms. Contemporary society as a whole could simply not be aware of the 
extent to which our theorists are misleading us, and as yet, a modern day 
Plato has not emerged to show us 'the truth'. 
A further, more grounded, explanation for the discrepancy between the 
applied motivations of the two sets of thinkers is one of interpretation. Whilst 
it is true that temporal circumstances have changed, influencing how people 
would go about their enquiries as well as what they would find and how they 
would deal with their results, the sophists may have been treated remarkably 
similariy to postmodern theorists by their society. Our understanding of the 
sophists is focussed through the somewhat biased (Platonist) lens of history, 
and of course what we perceive is not necessarily the picture we were 
intended to receive, let alone an accurate presentation of the facts (as much 
as they themselves can exist). We must be careful to allow for 
misunderstanding that can be attributed to problems of communication, 
translation (both temporal and linguistic) and natural uncertainty of what is. 
Perhaps supporting evidence is found in practical forms. Catherine Osborne 
describes the sophists as spin-doctors, hoodwinking the poor and milking the 
rich.^^ This puts me in mind of a quote from Blackadder the Third, where the 
devious butler explains social order as he sees it: "Toffs at the top, plebs at 
the bottom, and me in the middle making a fat pile of cash out of both of 
them!" It also however makes me think of the political advisors who now play 
such an important role in politics. Few commentators would argue that the 
business of winning elections is something other than convincing the masses 
how to vote, and getting the wealthy to fund you in this goal. This 
interpretation leads to some negativity towards the sophists, but their role, like 
that of spin-doctors, is an important one in democratic systems. Plato, to my 
'^ Osborne, Presocratic Philosophy: A ven,' short introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) 
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mind, never fully disproved the importance of arete (skill) with his argument 
that the best ruler is a moral one, since according even to his own argument 
the best ruler is both moral and skilful. The morality of the sophists may have 
been questionable but their skill was not. Sophist skills, doctrines and 
understandings have a role to play, and more than just that of the other that 
helps define the self of post-socratic society. Most clearly, this is exhibited is 
through the machinations of political aides in both these and many other 
epochs, who engage in the necessary business of convincing people. 
Wording the theory 
An interesting point of comparison between sophistic and postmodern theory 
is the delivery method used to justify and spread the theories. Typical critical-
forms associated with the two movements in question reveal a parallel that 
may be of significance and that is the interesting form. Parody is often 
considered central to postmodernism and it can easily (and accurately) be 
likened to the paradoxologica used by the sophists. Both criticise convention 
through a form of light-hearted rhetoric that reveals how silly the convention in 
question is. They are used to engage with history and lead the audience to 
re-evaluate their understanding of it. Dominic LaCapra wrote the following in 
reference to the postmodern utility of pastiche, but he could equally have 
been writing them about typical sophistic device, 
a certain use of irony and parody may play a role both in the critique of ideology and 
in the anticipation of a policy wherein commitment does not exclude but accompanies 
an ability to achieve critical distance on one's deepest commitments and desires. 
I believe that there is more to the similarities that I have obsen/ed than pure 
coincidence. Linguistic devices are important analytical tools, and the critical 
theorists that I am considering here have recognised this regardless of their 
eras. Geoffrey Harpham takes a different view to me when he claims that the 
LaCapra, History Politics and the Novel (Ithica & New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 128 
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'linguistic turn' is a uniquely self-defeating problem of twentieth century 
thinking. He explains why "nothing meaningful... can be said about language 
as such, both because language 'as such' is not available for direct 
observation and because the features, aspects, characteristics, and qualities 
that can be attributed to language approach the infinite"^^. He takes issue 
with the analysis of Derrida, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Gramsci and Hume to 
name just a few, and offers a deep criticism of the method of modern and 
postmodern philosophy. To Harpham, linguistic analysis is a contemporary 
obsession that has shaped the development of all theory connected to it.^ '^  
The important sentiment here is that the form (in this case language) 
influences the content (the theory) and although I do not agree with 
Harpham's claims that linguistic obsession is something new and potentially 
worthless, I do agree that the wording of sophistic and postmodern theories 
influenced (and was influenced by) their nature. 
Contemporary forms bear a resemblance to Ancient ones in more than just 
the field of political theory. The 'culture of spin' that seems to be a part of 
contemporary practical politics bears similarities to the way that politics was 
practiced in Ancient Greece. The image of a politician and the 
convincingness of his rhetoric are what determine how successful he is, 
though arguably this has been the case throughout history: Alexander the 
Great, Julius Ceaser and Adolf Hitler were all great demagogues and media 
managers for instance. That the form no longer requires any content, or that 
celebrity is its own gratuitous reward, is evidence of postmodernism in the 
world around us. In the contemporary world, just as in Ancient Greece, we 
are entertained by novel rhetoric to the extent that evidence and dialectic no 
longer concern us as much as (according to modernist moral standards) they 
should. 
It is naive to claim that only postmodernists and sophists are concerned with 
language, as the relationship between language and knowledge is of central 
Harpham, Language Alone: The Critical Fetish of Modernity (London & New York: Routledge, 
2002), p.ix 
Harpham, Language Alone 
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philosophical importance. Plato articulated this in his Cratylus but it is an idea 
that has recurred countless times. "Early in its development, a philosophical 
tradition will consider the nature of language, for language is, after all, the 
medium of philosophical expression. To be truly philosophical, inquiry must 
have at least a rudimentary theory between the relationship between words 
and non-linguistic reality."^^ 
Similar but different 
To my mind it is clear that there are similarities (even if they are non exclusive 
similarities) between the theories of the sophists and postmodern thinkers. 
These similarities exist in form and method: in what the theorists said and 
how they said it. I will expand on the reasons for these similarities, both 
structural and intellectual, in later chapters. 
The following sentiment came from a book on Descartes but it holds true for 
everything that I have been exploring in this chapter. 
Some years ago, an anthropologist friend told me something of what it is like to do 
field work. When one enters a new community, she said, it is all very alien, an alien 
language, alien customs, alien traditions. After a while things change; the language 
and customs become familiar, and the once-alien community is just like home. The 
final stage comes when the similarities and differences come into focus, when one 
recognises what ones subjects share with us, while at the same time appreciating the 
genuine differences there are between them and us. The case is similar for the 
history of philosophy. We cannot ignore the ways in which past thinkers are involved 
in projects similar to ours, and the ways in which we can learn from what they have 
written, how it can contribute to our search for philosophical enlightenment. At the 
same time, we cannot ignore the ways in which they differ from us, the way in which 
their programs differ from ours, the way in which they ask different questions and 
make different assumptions.^® 
55 Kasulis, 'Reference and symbol in Plato's Cratylus and Kuukai's Shojijissogi', in Philosophy East 
and West, vol. 32:4 (1982), p.393 
Garber, Descartes Embodied: R 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.30 
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It is important to see both the similarities between ideas of the present and 
the past, and the differences. I will say again that I do not simply believe that 
postmodernism is sophistry 'rehashed' but perhaps it is the modern 
equivalent. 
On the subject of similar yet different interpretations I would like to just briefly 
talk about Socrates. It may have occurred to the astute reader already that 
much of the similarity I have observed is in relation to theorists' willingness to 
ask questions and defy the dictates of conventional morality (challenge 
nomoi). Socrates was of course famous for asking questions too, but the 
reason that he is not the same as the sophists or postmodernists was 
because he used the process of questioning to guide people he engaged with 
toward his conclusion. Socrates' elenchos exposed falsehoods and 
inconsistencies within the beliefs of his interlocutors and he used their 
confusion to discover stable moral definitions rather than flimsy inherited or 
assumed bases for moral understanding. The aim was to uncover a universal 
true morality and support this truth through elentic investigation with every 
human being who bothered to address it.^'' The key difference between 
Socrates and the sophists or postmodernists that I am most interested in is of 
course the fact that Socrates thinks that answers are available to him. Janet 
Coleman writes. 
There is an important contrast between the Socratic position and that of either of the 
two Sophists, Protagoras or Gorgias. For both Sophists, how things 'really' are is not 
discoverable by inquiry and argument. For them philosophical activity simply does 
not get at the truth; for Gorgias it gets at no truth at all but at more or less good 
arguments and for Protagoras it gets at as many truths as there are men, culturally 
situated, who experience the world of appearances.^^ 
Relativism, the concept of doubting absolutes and higher truths, is a timeless 
concept that has resurfaced and, to my mind, this must have happened for a 
" Klosko, 'Rational Persuasion in Plato's Political Theory' History of Political Thought 7 (1986), 
pp.15-31 
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reason. Perhaps the failure of empirically lacking structuralist assertions, not 
dissimilar to the unscientific metaphysical models produced by the Milesian 
School of presocratics, was the trigger but it is telling that the critical trend has 
again blossomed. Maybe an epoch of human history is ending, just as 
happened in Ancient Greece when Plato's philosophy fundamentally 
redirected mankind's historic course, or perhaps it is a more limited natural 
(even defensive) human reaction to the perceived failure of religion or science 
to support its absolute answers. The resurgence of relativism could be in no 
way connected to the ideas of ancient Greece; certainly the context is 
different, meaning a different process for the development of the idea not to 
mention its application, but to my mind the two epochs are different but the 
same. I think that the postmodernism Is part of a process, and I am 
fascinated to see where it leads this time around. 
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THE INTELLECTUAL BACKDROP TO POSTMODERNISM 
Several important theorists laid theoretical foundations that allowed the 
sophists and postmodern thinkers to reach their conclusions. I have already 
mentioned the role that various theorists played in the ancient world, but in 
this chapter I will be making a more detailed case study of two contemporary 
philosophers who were fundamental to the development of postmodern 
political theory. I will be looking at Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche 
and explaining where they fit into the development of the theory. These 
philosophers were not of course the only intellectual background to 
postmodernism and the first part of the chapter will concern itself with setting 
out the context for their philosophising in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries respectively. 
I have chosen to look in detail at just two theorists but an expanded study 
could look in detail at the work of many other theorists including Rousseau, 
Hegel and Marx. I have deliberately set aside the philosophy of Marx and 
Engels because although I am aware of its value and its influence on the 
contemporary world, and although I agree with the sentiment that "Marxism is 
the most important criticism of the dominant Western form of economic 
modernity, capitalism"^^, I none the less categorise the results of their work as 
more of a material socio-economic background to the work of the sophists 
than an intellectual one. I will make comparisons to my ancient parallel, but 
primarily this chapter is concerned with setting the intellectual scene that was 
responsible for the development of postmodernism in the late twentieth 
century. 
Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism, p.91 
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The basis for critical theory 
Many philosophers have played a part in the development of postmodernism. 
Some have played their role by directly critiquing modernity whilst others have 
tried to reinforce modernism and through their failings, or in response to their 
successes have encouraged further epistemological rebellion. It is difficult to 
establish a starting point for the theory that I am interested in because of the 
fundamental nature of the ideas involved but perhaps through looking at what 
they rejected this can be achieved. 
The cult of modernity was conceived in the Enlightenment. Rene Descartes, 
writing in the Century, attempted to use reason to build a metaphysical 
model of understanding from base principles. He engaged in perhaps the first 
phenomenological inquiry by problematising the context of all understanding. 
Descartes began his work by reducing certainty to a single concept: Cogito 
Ergo Sum, I think, therefore I am. He made an almost protagorean claim in 
his first meditation that. 
All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have 
learned either from the senses of through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to 
me that the senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by 
which we have once been deceived.®" 
Descartes goes on to recognise that his beliefs are really just opinions that he 
has more reason to believe in than to deny: a realization that he does not 
have access to universal truths. He however reacts differently to these 
realizations than the sophists did before him and postmodernists would do in 
his wake. "Descartes sought an absolute certain foundation from which he 
could prove the existence of god, the proper method of science, and the 
existence of the material world, thereby harmonising theology and the new 
science"^\ The starting point for this certainty that Descartes identified was 
consciousness, the only thing he knew to be true and real, although his critics 
*° Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), trans. Haldane and Ross, in The Philosophical 
Works of Descartes, vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 145 
Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism, p.29 
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doubt even this since he does not (even cannot) prove that his own 
consciousness exists. The claim that, "...there is nothing which is easier for 
me to know than my mind..."^^ may be true, but it does not necessarily follow 
that one can even know ones own mind. 
I do not see the need to discuss the later discourses because I have already 
made my point. The work of Descartes foreshadows that of postmodernism 
at the same time as it lays the foundations for modern ways of thinking. 
Understanding the problems of Cartesian metaphysics leads to an 
understanding of the failure of science and the reasons for radical critical 
theory: everything we believe to be true is founded on the philosophy of a 
man who suffered from human fallibility. In a way I think that this attests to 
the idea that a radical critical theory was intellectually inevitable at some 
point. Postmodernism is the yin to the yang of foundationalism - the sort of 
theorising that Descartes and Plato both engaged in that attempts to establish 
foundations of knowledge and judgement. 
Descartes stands for something artificial. He is credited with separating first 
philosophy and natural philosophy, or as we now call them philosophy and 
science.^^ He worked toward establishing a universal rational-scientific 
methodology based around his Rules for the Direction of ttie l\/lind, and in 
doing so helped to establish the framework of modernity that the 
postmodernists so ardently reject. Another philosopher who was involved 
intimately with this process was Michel de Montaigne who paved the way for 
enlightenment understandings about cultural relativism by asking over and 
over again "what do I know?" 
Like Descartes, Montaigne started from sceptical principles - disbelieving our 
access to knowledge - and went on to develop a theory that advocated 
modernist scientific ones. It is plausible to claim that radical doubt was 
necessary for the new sort of certainty based on scientific principles. The 
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 157 
Garber, Descartes Embodies: Reading Cartesian Philosophy Through Cartesian Science (Chicago: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
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good scientist after all, is the one willing to test all assumptions, to challenge 
all traditional opinion, to get closer to the truth. The problem with this analysis 
is not that ultimate truth, such as was claimed by religious thinkers, is 
unattainable by scientists, but that we sometimes forget this limitation. 
Montaigne best phrased this sentiment when he claimed that, "there is a 
plague on man, the opinion that he knows something"^''. 
I have been a little harsh on Montaigne in setting him alongside Descartes as 
commentators often comment on his reasonable use of reason, especially 
when compared to the latter. The Cartesian ideology of Reason fuelled the 
relentless Juggernaut of Science that remains challenged only by 
postmodernism would likely have appalled Montaigne. He stood for 
something more human and if Europe had adopted his pattern of 
understanding perhaps rationalization to the extreme that gave birth to radical 
critical theory might not have occurred. None the less both Montaigne and 
Descartes used scepticism to clear the path for reason and religion. The 
apparent failings of both of these structures of understanding in the late 
twentieth century is something that I believe is intrinsically linked to the rebirth 
of relativism in the work of the sophists. 
One final theorist to note when discussing the backdrop to (pre-) postmodern 
theorising is Georg Hegel whose work constitutes an integral part of the fabric 
of modern thought. Reading Hegels foundation concepts is similar to reading 
the origin theories of the presocratic philosophers who I discussed earlier. In 
the start there is nothing but Geist (Mind or Spirit) containing but one idea, 
that of existence or being. From one idea all others are deduced and 
eventually the Mind transforms into its opposite, matter in an event equivalent 
to the Big Bang as we now understand it. From this start, all of human history 
represents the unfolding, or growing, of the original Mind.^^ The idea is poetic 
and perhaps rather indebted to Anaximander's theory that everything formed 
from Apieron, the infinite. Clearly Hegel utilises a more human understanding 
but his theory probably played a very similar role to that of the presocratics in 
^ Montaigne, The Essays of Michel Montaigne, trans. Screech (London: Penguin Press, 1991), p.543 
Adams and Dyson, Fifty Major Political Thinkers (London & New York: Routledge, 2003) 
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framing the rise of postmodernism. Thinkers like Descartes, Hegel and 
Montaigne all represent something that postmodernism kicked away from, 
reacted against and at least in part, defined itself through opposition to. 
Immanuel Kant 
A theorist who I believe played an important role in setting the context for 
relativist political philosophy is Immanuel Kant. His role was something akin 
to that of Parmenides of Elea in my ancient parallel because of his critical 
interest in the sciences. I also think his opinion about knowledge is familiar: 
he claimed that, "...experience does indeed teach me what exists and what it 
is like, but never that it must necessarily be so and not othenwise. Therefore 
it can never teach me the nature of things in themselves."^^ Like so many of 
the theorists that I am considering, Kant struggled with questions about how 
he could know anything and this doubt must have contributed to the theory 
that he conceived. "In its very conception, metaphysics involves a genuine 
extension of human cognition beyond what is known through experience."^'' 
Like so many theorists Kant ended up turning on convention when he realised 
that he did not have access to universal truths. 
Kant was the modern master of critical theorising and his work serves as the 
outline for understanding 'the politics of critique'.^^ The sophistication of 
critical postmodernism would not be possible without the guidelines of 
Kantian critique, but more than this, Kant played a crucial role in directing his 
critical theory and showing the fallibility of the totems of modernity. His work 
represents a milestone in the history of intellectualism and although what he 
said is often misunderstood because of its complexity, I am spending time 
dealing with him because, 
^ Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Present Itself as Science, trans. 
Zoller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), §14, p. 101 
Kant, Prolegomena, trans. ZoUer, 'Overview' p.28 
••^  Hutchings, Kant Critique and Politics (London & New York: Routledge, 1996) 
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... the critical discourses, from Kant onwards, can all be read as lapsing back into 
precritical alternatives. In the works of Kant, Habermas and Ardent, in particular, 
critique seems in constant danger of reverting either to an authoritarian dogmatism, 
in which the philosopher holds the key to judgement, or to a radical scepticism in 
which judgement becomes impossible.^® 
Critique was reborn in Kant's work at the same time as it was condemned, 
and although he made it possible for there to be useful criticisms, in doing so 
he showed the fallacy of techniques that did not meet his standards. Much 
post-Kanitan theory does not dare be critical for fear of being interpreted as 
either self-serving dogmatic rhetoric, or as bland description too passive to 
pass judgements with authority. 
The dilemma is an important one to consider in conjunction with 
postmodernism and in conjunction with the sophistry of Ancient Athens. In 
the Athenian context I believe that the two perils of critique detailed by Kant 
were exemplified by the theories put forward by Plato (who believed that the 
philosopher held the key to judgement) and the sophists (who believed that 
judgement was impossible). Postmodern theory is richer for its understanding 
of these problematic dynamics of criticism. Thanks to Kant, postmodernists 
have realised that modernity cannot be attacked with anything more than the 
opinions of those who oppose it. Of course they value these opinions more 
than Kant did based upon their belief that truth is unattainable. 
Postmodernism embraces the problem that Kant outlined and is not 
concerned that reason demands critique is either descriptive or self-serving. 
Justification is something that the modern, rational wortd must deal with and it 
has no place in the opinion-oriented realm of the postmodern. Although Kant 
refused to be drawn to dogmatic or sceptical conclusions, Derrida, Foucault, 
Lyotard and their contemporaries utilise arguments that should invalidate their 
criticisms according to Kant. Their answer to his criticism of their critiques is 
simply that they claim no allegiance to his structured rule system, which they 
see as a product of the modem wortd and a part of the very modern method 
Hutchings, Kant Critique and Politics, p.3 
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that they are criticising. In Athens, Parmenides and the sophists showed the 
same lack of respect toward the rules of the Milesians. What they had to say 
fundamentally undermined the existing system of understanding so any 
criticisms levelled at them from within that system were logically made null 
and void. 
Kant's work desen/es more attention than a passing mention since it does 
represent an important stage in the development of postmodern theory, even 
if postmodernists rather ironically dispute the notion of development. Kant's 
criticism of empirical reasoning is particularly interesting because he did not 
reject modern science despite the threat that he saw it posing to morality and 
autonomy. What he did think, was that people should trust themselves and 
their own judgements more: for him the motto of enlightenment was "Sapere 
aude!" (literally meaning 'dare to be wise') and he urged people to, "Have 
courage and use your own understanding!"''" This classical republican idea 
(perhaps borrowed from Ancient Greece or Rome) that autonomy is central to 
human completion was the reason that Kant challenged science, morality and 
religion as social crutches. 
Immaturity is easy according to Kant, and we do not learn to trust ourselves 
because we are lazy as well as being scared of being autonomous and free-
thinking. As part of his own enlightenment Kant was critical of many facets of 
life around him and he problematised the mundane in a social context Qust as 
modern phenomonologists do) but also in a scientific context. Kant's first 
published work, Thioughts on ttie True Estimation of Living Forces, 
questioned the nature and method of metaphysics in the context of breaking 
mathematical physics and initiated "a fundamental philosophical 
reconsideration of Newtonian physics"''\ In essence, what Kant did, like 
Parmenides long before him, was dispute conventional social and scientific 
assumptions and pave the way for future theorists to go a step further and 
dispute convention altogether. 
™ Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' in, Reiss (ed.) Kant's Political 
Writings, trans. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.54 
'^ Friedman, Kant and the Exact Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.xi 
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Friedrich Nietzsche 
The philosopher who I consider perhaps the most important intellectual 
facilitator of postmodernism was Friedrich Nietzsche and perhaps the reason 
for his importance was that he was a classicist before he was a philosopher. 
Nietzsche understood the pre-history of ideas and drew heavily on classics 
when he developed his own theory. He occupies an interesting position in my 
portrait of relativist political theory because whilst he may or may not have 
been the first postmodernist (something that I will go on to discuss), he 
certainly influenced postmodernism through his formulations about the 
modern world, based upon his understanding of the Ancient one. 
Just as Kant had hoped, the enlightenment forwarded the cause of autonomy 
and allowed bourgeois individuals to become self-sufficient. Of course the 
proletariat paid for this with dependency and alienation according to Marx, but 
their sacrifice did lead to change not entirely unlike, though far more subtle, 
than that which Marxism predicted. 
...separation and self-sufficiency, which, considered from the standpoint of 
philosophy of history, paved the way for emancipation from age-old dependencies, 
were experienced at the same time as abstraction and alienation from the totality of 
an ethical context of life. Once religion had been the unbreakable seal upon this 
totality; it is not by chance that this seal has been broken. 
Modernity undermined enlightenment and religious values, leading Nietzsche 
to assert that 'God is dead'. I think that this void of certainty is in part what 
allowed for the rebirth of relativism. One cannot be a relativist if one has faith 
or a belief in dogma but when that faith wanes it leads to the asking of 
unanswerable questions about the nature of things. If nothing else it seems 
like more than pure chance that the philosophical musings of the sophists and 
postmodernists both occur in atheising (if not fully atheist) social climes. 
Habermas, T h e Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point', The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Lawrence (Cornwall: Polity Press, 1987), pp.83-4 
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The claim that 'God is dead' is more than a simple statement of atheism. 
Nietzsche was asserting that modernity is on the verge of collapsing in on 
itself because "the highest values have devalued themselves."'^^ The highest 
values that he means are Platonic or Christian ideals that encourage 
community. It is not entirely clear whether his assertion that "Morality in 
Europe today is herd animal mentality"'''* refers to these ideals or to what is 
left in their wake and perhaps the best interpretation is something of a 
compromise: the development of herd mentality is encouraged by the ideals 
of modernity if not consciously then as a result of how the project is bound to 
pan out. Robert Pippin, commentating on Nietzsche's effect on the modernity 
problem, aptly summarises the philosopher's opinion that there is something 
historically distinctive about modernity: 
His claim is that we live in an age in which there are numerous 'signs' revealing (to 
those with eyes to see) that this entire post-Platonic project has begun to collapse 
under the weight of the dilemmas and aporiai it created for itself, to terminate in an 
anomic, directionless "herd society," and most fundamentally in an experience of 
worthlessness and enervation Nietzsche calls 'nihilism' or 'the radical repudiation of 
value, meaning and desirability'.^^ 
The fact that Nietzsche envisaged the quite postmodern growth of nihilism 
does not necessarily make him a postmodernist, just as me agreeing that 
base economic concerns influence social superstructures does not make me 
a Marxist. Nietzsche fought against the outcome and proposed a politics for 
the future: the Ubermensch or Supermen who should be strong, cruel and 
undemocratic. The Ubermensch put me in mind of the unjust man that 
Thrasymachus advocated or the truly just man that Callicles talked about. 
They should be leaders who are in touch with their true nature and instincts, 
disciplined and able to make sacrifices but ultimately autonomous unlike the 
weak modern man who plays it safe and takes refuge in the crowd. The 
" Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), p.9 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. 115 
^' Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High Culture 
(Cornwall: Blackwell, 1991), pp.82-3 
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influence of Kant is clear: man must awake from his immaturity and become 
autonomous, something that can only be achieved through questioning the 
wortd around and perhaps more importantly criticising it. In Kanitan terms 
Nietzsche may appear as a dogmatist but perhaps this understanding is in 
part due to the application and corruption of Nietzsche's theory long after his 
death as a foundation for the Third Reich. Heidegger's understanding of 
Nietzsche is doubtless better founded, and I defer to his assertion that 
Nietzsche leads the counter movement to nihilism as an artist-philosopher.^^ 
In a way it is not important how Nietzsche's response to nihilism is 
understood; the very fact that he had one is enough. Like Marx, he saw a 
danger to society and reacted by offering a solution, a solution that has since 
his time been twisted and turned to many an application. To my mind this 
sets him apart from contemporary postmodernists who embrace the change 
that nihilism offers and reject the very notion that society can be 'saved'. The 
analyst Clayton Koelb, when speculating about whether Nietzsche was 
actually a postmodernist or not, summarises the problem well: "Certainly 
Nietzsche is critical of the science and philosophy of his day, casting doubt on 
their efforts at self-legitimation, but does not his work as a whole aim toward 
the creation of its own metanarrative and thus its own version of 
modernism?"''''. Contra to this viewpoint one might argue that Nietzsche's 
work may at times be prescriptive, but that it refuses to be defined by a single 
progressive story: his work, like that of the Ancient Greek thinkers he 
admired, is "superficial - out of profoundity."''^ 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that supports claims that Nietzsche 
was a postmodernist is found in his 'perspectivism'. Christianity instilled in 
Western minds a love of truth and a consequence of this has been the growth 
of science. Science has undermined the concept of God and in doing so has 
disrupted the underlying metaphysics of meaning: without God there is no 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, volume 1: The Will to Power as Art (New York & London: Harper & Row, 
1979) 
Koelb (ed.), Nietzsche as Postmodernist: essays pro and contra (New York: State University of New 
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absolute truth and no single belief has any inherent worth over all other 
beliefs. All truth is relative (though the problem with this statement is that it 
must itself be a relative truth) and the only truth is that there is no one truth: 
truth is particularised not universal. This takes us right back to where the 
sophists left off; all we have access to is belief and we should use this to 
advance ourselves.''^ 
Babette Babich makes a good case for understanding the postmodern as 
post-Nietzsche. In other words Nietzsche was a part of the matrix of 
modernity who contributed to the growth of postmodernism but cannot himself 
be understood as a postmodernist. The particular contribution that she 
emphasises is Nietzsche's musings on the meaning of the post-enlightenment 
subject: the postmodern humanist.^° Babich backs up this assertion by 
pointing to the work of Charles Jencks who finds Nietzsche to be a paradigm 
of modernity. He claims that Nietzsche, Einstein and Freud represent core 
proponents of the modern world and that postmodernism is their Ideas taken 
to extremes; to the point of failure, which becomes a failure of modernity.^^ 
Finding an answer to the question of how Nietzsche and postmodernism 
relate to one another is intellectual quicksand. Babich concludes that, 
A reflection on the relevance of Nietzscfie to thie postmodern condition of thought is a 
reflection on the relevance of the question of the question, the ability to question, and 
to think. This reflection can begin in a time after the prize of thought, the illusion of 
the accession to the ultimate object, has been dismantled. The broken shards of the 
illusion, the shattered mirror of representation, offer metonymic conduction which 
lines primacy, fulfilment, or truth, or on the left, the side of failure, incompletion, or 
illusion, and leads, as a tentative question that asks where it does not know what it 
will find, to the inevitable shifting of the signifier, and the ambiguity of the Real that 
impossibly circumscribes the human condition. 
" Adams & Dyson, Fifty Major Political Thinkers (London & New York: Routledge, 2003) 
Babich, 'Nietzsche and the Condition of Postmodern Thought', in Koelb (ed.), Nietzsche as 
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To my mind this is evidence that the problem is ultimately unsolvable. 
Nietzsche and postmodernism are related, but finding the exact nature of that 
relationship is not something that any amount of analysis can establish. One 
perspective is that Nietzsche's ideas were pre-modern, another is that they 
were highly modern, and another is that they were postmodern. His work has 
a lot of room for interpretation, "...and this alone makes him attractive for 
postmodern interpretation and interpretation as a postmodernist."^^ Perhaps 
it is more of a reflection on postmodernism that it finds influence in historic 
works as some kind of justification after the event. If this is the case then 
similarities with the works of the sophists may too be coincidental but at the 
same time useful to back up the theory. I am not fond of this idea because it 
gives postmodernism too much credit as being intellectually independent and 
original (something that any true postmodernist should reject on the basis of 
all understanding being reliant on context). To my mind postmodernists have 
reinterpreted Nietzsche and parodied his ideas, making him an important part 
of their context and composition. 
Solomon, 'Nietzsche, Postmodernism and Resentment', in Koelb (ed.), Nietzsche as Postmodernist: 
essays pro and contra, p.271 
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THE LAST THEORY 
Having gone some way toward setting the intellectual backdrop to 
postmodernism I now want to explore the material reasons behind the theory. 
There is a feeling now that the world is entering a new age, and whilst opinion 
is divided on when this change occurred and what the world is becoming, the 
notion of change is almost universal. How the changing world has interacted 
with postmodern ideas will be my focus and I will try to clarify the relationship. 
To do this I will first detail what I believe to be the important domestic and 
international circumstances that have surrounded and made change possible. 
Among these circumstances I will detail my base analysis regarding 
globalization, which will allow me to discuss its relationship to postmodern 
political theory in following sections. I am also keen to talk in this chapter 
about the problems of labelling this new era that we seem to share a belief in 
as something particularly new. 
The changed contemporan/ world 
It is no fairer to say that every theorist now believes that the world has 
changed than it would be to claim that every theorist is a postmodernist, but 
just as academics now must acknowledge the notion of postmodernism even 
if they dispute it, they must recognise that structures and ideas are not what 
they were fifty years ago. Modern technological advances have forever 
changed the human condition politically and socially, and new tools of 
understanding are required to cope with this. 
After the Second World War, British historian Arnold Toynbee asserted that 
mankind had entered the fourth and final phase of western history, the 
'-postmodern" phase, which would be characterised by irrationalism and 
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angst.^"* More famously, Francis Fukuyama claimed in 1989 that history had 
ended, that the ideas of the West had triumphed and that no further 
ideological progress would be made.^^ These two thinkers were not alone in 
seeing the second half of the twentieth century as a turning point of human 
history based on material changes, and although their ideas were not 
universally accepted, it became clear that the end of the Second World War 
and the Cold War were events that would forever change conventional 
political understandings. On the surface it may have appeared that only 
international relations would have to be understood in different terms, but due 
to the interiinked nature of all exchanges of power, the effects on the 
domestic sphere were bound to be noteworthy. I believe that proofs of this 
unilateral change are all too clear to be ignored. 
As well as Fukuyama's understanding about what the end of the Cold War 
would mean, there were two other important theories about what would 
happen to the wortd: Huntington's idea that the clash of civilizations and 
human conflict in general were inevitable, and Held and Falk's understanding 
that a global civil society or a cosmopolitan democracy would emerge. These 
fresh approaches would break apart the inter-paradigm debate, an ideological 
conflict within the discipline that had so long allowed realism to dominate the 
theory and practice of international relations, so to an extent their very 
presence (rather than their truthfulness) was important for the evolution of our 
political understanding.^^ With hindsight perhaps we can see elements of 
truth in all three of these theories since the contemporary world is perhaps 
quite changed from the one we used to know and yet it is still rife with conflict. 
I will be focussing on the idea of the end of history in this section of the essay 
because I think that the distinction between epochs is best marked by that 
phrase. I do not fully believe that we now exist in the tail end of human 
civilization, playing out the inevitable final reprise of liberal-capitalism, but I do 
Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) 
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think that we are entering a new age and the end of history that Fukuyama 
detailed is a landmark worth recognising. I particularly like Zbigniew 
Brezinski's opinion on this period, which is that we are 'between two ages', 
the past age of nation states and an unknown future age, although I would 
expand this idea a little and say that we are between an age of convention 
and something more radical in socio-cultural, as well as geo-political terms.^'' 
The new age where conventional political understandings have been revoked 
is fundamentally linked with the theory of postmodernism, indeed it could 
even be called the practice of it. When talking about the period of transition 
following the end of history I believe we are talking about the postmodern era 
as much as it exists in definable temporal terms. When exactly the world 
became postmodern is not really important or as simple as a single date or 
event, though in order to share an understanding of when we are talking 
about I will say that to my mind the ideas were born of the late 1960s but 
became 'real' in the late 1980s; the collapse of the former world order that 
was the Cold War having resulted in an ideological and organizational 
vacuum that was filled by postmodernism. I agree (conditionally) with what 
Barry Smart says, even though he made the claim a decade before I would 
perhaps have agreed with it. 
The idea that we are living in new times is interesting, pervasive, if not seductive, 
particularly in a crucial context where there has been, for some time now, a cult of the 
new, a social and economic context in which innovation and novelty have been 
promoted, their virtues extolled, often through implied associations with ideas of 
progress and/or development. Moreover, on a number of fronts there do appear to 
be signs of significant forms of change permeating social, economic, political and 
cultural institutions and practices. Such signs have undoubtedly lent credence to the 
idea of new times.^ ® 
87 Garnett, 'States, State-centric Perspectives and Interdependence theory', section 1, chapter 2 of 
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When the Athenian Ennpire defeated Persia in the Cyprus campaign of 450-
49 BC, crushing the fleet of Phoenician and Ciliclan ships, it allowed Pericles 
to negotiate an end to the war. The exact details of the peace (known as the 
peace of Callias) are unclear and, although it represented a cessation of 
hostilities. It does seem unlikely that Athens would have deliberately made 
peace with the 'other' whose threatening nature justified her empire unless 
circumstance forced the resolution. Regardless, the period must have been 
as historic as the end of the Cold War and the people who had known war 
with Persia for so long must have imagined that the peace (if it lasted) would 
usher in a new world era - an impression that would have been important 
regardless of the actual course that events took. The way that peace came 
about was interesting because it involved factors both internal and external to 
Athens. Firstly the death of the powerful Athenian statesman Cimon, who 
had been a driving force behind the war, meant that Pericles could negotiate 
with the support of Athens, and secondly, the victory in Cition meant that the 
Great King was disposed to negotiate from the Persian side.^^ The whole 
period of detente, although it did not result in either side crumbling as 
happened to the USSR in the late 1980s, was a turning point in history that 
definitely had an effect on the philosophical, political and social formulations 
that followed immediately after it. 
Of the theories intended to understand the post Cold War world mentioned 
earlier, the one that best explains what happened next in Ancient Greece is 
Huntingdon's idea that political (and indeed military) strife is part of the human 
condition. Athens and Sparta of course went to war with one another after 
the peace with Persia was secured, and the conflict continued showing 
perhaps that although the enemy's name may change, we do not. Perhaps 
the contemporary War on Terror is another example of this, proving that 
whilst the method and tools may change, humanity's attitude endures and will 
lead to conflict and adversary following every spell of peace no matter what 
new age or state of enlightenment we claim to be in. Theoretical evidence to 
support this is found when one expands, to the national level, the postmodern 
Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander 
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idea that self is reflexive, because as a polls, Athens was defined in 
opposition to the other of her enemies. 
The global world 
The approach offered fonward by some of the most reasonable and fonward 
thinking theorists writing about the global world is not one that results in war 
and it is justified with analysis of the contemporary world rather than 
reference back to history. The birth of a global civil society in the late 
twentieth century has been facilitated by modern technology and political 
understandings relevant to a changing world where, for instance, fundamental 
principles of international security have changed and are continuing to 
change. New models of understanding global relations have grown in the gulf 
left by traditional realist and Idealist theories and the most significant of these 
is the idea of globalization. Like postmodernism, it is a pseudo-pop culture 
term that is over used and understood by too few, and that is why this essay 
will now focus in on the term and try to define what exactly it means and why 
it is relevant to this discussion. 
There is no simple answer to what globalization is but this does not prevent it 
from being an important concept. Prominent theorists in this field David Held 
and Anthony McGrew start one of their most recent books on globalization 
with a sentiment that sums up why I have decided to include study of the 
phenomenon in this essay. 
Globalization is an idea whose time has come. From obscure origins in French and 
American writings of the 1960s, the concept of globalization finds expression today in 
all the world's major languages. Yet, it lacks precise definition. Indeed, globalization 
is in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliche of our times: the big 
idea which encompasses everything from global financial markets to the internet but 
which delivers little substantive insight into the contemporary human condition.®" 
90 Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture 
(Cornwall: Polity Press, 1999), p.l 
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Essentially globalization is used to describe what has happened to the 
contemporary world and how it happened, but it is so broad that it is not of 
analytic use unless it Is first itself dissected. What I will try to do here is look 
at the fine detail of the popular perception that the world is becoming a shared 
social space (a global village) where everything is interconnected thanks to 
new technology and new political understandings. 
I believe that postmodern political understandings are partly a response to 
globalization, but at the same time they are part of the driving force behind it 
and this idea is something that I want to carry through my study of the global 
era. What I hope to achieve by this is a better understanding of the role of the 
ideas of the sophists in their own time since I believe that the two periods 
share circumstantial links as have been discussed in previous chapters. 
Further to this I believe that showing an intrinsic link between postmodernism 
and globalization will help to show the practical usefulness of postmodern 
theory since thus far I have been unable to show the full importance of the 
theory in the real world. 
The proof of globalization, like the supposed proof of any radical concept, is 
disputed: theorists like Michael Mann are quick to point out that belief in 
globalization cannot be proved, and that like postmodernism it may exist only 
in as much as people want it to, or feel it should exist.^^ Mann is cautious 
about making any simplistic assumptions about globalization and 
postmodernity (even as far as fully acknowledging their existence) but I must 
dispute this if I am to say anything at all on the subject. In order to make a 
meaningful study of the link between globalization and postmodernism I must 
put aside my relativism and agree that the phenomena exist, though I will still 
explore criticisms too, particularly regarding the extent to which globalization 
represents a change to the world order. 
As one would expect from what is perhaps a demi-realization of pure 
postmodern theory, globalization is not uniform, rational or progressive. It 
'^ Mann, 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Fall of the Nation-State?', in, Review of International 
Political Economy, 4:3 (1997), 472-96 
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draws from a multitude of influences and reinterprets them to create hybrid 
forms. The term 'hybridization' was used by Nederveen Pieterse to describe 
the development of the crossover culture that explained the origin of third way 
thinking: the development of new combination approaches to old ideological 
and practical i m p a s s e s . T h e principal is that fusing together existing ideas 
can allow access to, rather than create, new ones and this sits well with the 
postmodern philosophy that emphasises the importance of perspective and 
refutes originality. Trying to find new approaches to problems is not a new 
idea in politics and the idea of borrowing approaches from other nations and 
adapting them to different circumstances should not really be considered new 
either. Plato, the father of philosophy, accredited with one of the most 
inventive and original ideas in history, utilised the myth of the Spartan 
structure of governance when he detailed how philosopher kings should be 
allowed to rule for instance. Quite possibly he was utilizing an Ancient Greek 
form of hybridization that does not seem so different to the one that we can 
see in the world around us now, albeit on a larger scale thanks to enabling 
technologies of cultural exchange. 
Modern technology is of course an important part of globalization and huge 
progress was made in the twentieth century allowing fast, affordable and 
reliable global communication and travel. The scale on which commodities, 
both material and cultural, can be exchanged is greater now than was ever 
possible in the past. That said however it seems likely that there will always 
be more progress, and what will be most remarkable about the so called ITC 
revolution in years to come will be the speed at which it happened. 
Enormous advances in a short period of time are bound to have profound 
effects and it strikes me that the effect seen in the twentieth century could 
have been emulated by the kind of expanded access to the world that trade 
contracts and the building of more and faster ships might have brought after 
the Delian League was formed in Ancient Athens. This link is I fear a little 
tenuous, since by its nature the ITC revolution was something completely 
Robins 'Encountering Globalization', in Held & McGrew The Global Transformations Reader: An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Cornwall: Polity Press 2000) 
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unparalleled in history, though I am certain that I am not the first person to 
have trouble seeing beyond the apparent uniqueness of my own time. 
Opinion about globalization is anything but unified and whilst theorists like 
Ohmae and Giddens embrace the concept, there are others like Hurst, Hay 
and Thompson who claim that the thesis is overstated. A wide spectrum of 
opinion lies between the hyperglobalist and sceptical theories and most 
prominent among these is the transformationalist perspective, which claims 
that we are drifting toward a more global world but sees the current era as 
one of transition though not necessarily by design. Examining capital flows 
and trade patterns is one of the best ways that we can asses the scale of 
globalism. What I want to do now is look at the monetary proofs of 
globalization, though I recognise that this aspect of the phenomenon is less 
significant an indicator of the postmodern than observable cultural and socio-
political developments are. The reason for doing this is, as I have said 
before, that the economic, political and social spheres of our world are all 
intrinsically interlinked, and so proving the existence of globalization in one of 
these spheres will indicate the likelihood of Its presence in the others. 
The hyperglobalist claim is that there has been a huge increase in financial 
flows, facilitated by new technologies, that has had a profound effect on the 
stability of nation states, or more specifically on the sole sovereignty of nation 
states. In this interconnected age, nation states cannot be wholly 
autonomous or isolationist, as the international markets and the activities of 
multinational and trans-national companies will have an effect on them: if Wall 
Street sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold as the expression goes. 
Trade has increased from seven to seventeen percent of world output since 
1950 and between 1960 and 1996 the financial flows to developing countries 
exploded from $34.8bn to $251.9bn. Now every day world foreign exchange 
trading averages one thousand four hundred and ninety billion dollars yet 
despite these figures there are still theorists who doubt the existence of 
globalization.^^ In addition to this, the sales of cultural products and lifestyles, 
Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, Global Transformations 
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industries based on the gratification of desires to experience the exotic other 
through travel and ownership of symbols, have boomed creating their own 
market in a way that simply would not have been possible without the ITC 
revolution. 
The sceptical counterargument hinges on the fact that historically, the figures 
that we are talking about are not completely out of context. The Spanish and 
Portugese empire building of the 15*" Century and the Dutch and English 
mercantilism of the Century had both had profound cultural and economic 
influences on the world as it was, far more so than multinational corporations 
have now. This influence is magnified when one considers the slave trade 
that enforced mass migration and spread people and their culture across the 
world, throwing up a host of progressive hybrid and fusion cultures in its 
wake. Going even further back, the ancient empires such as Rome or Islam 
spread religion, race and structures, both economic and political, across the 
face of the world in a way that is simply not imaginable in contemporary 
times. 
What is actually important about what I have said here is that whether or not 
globalization has occurred or is occurring, we still share a general perception 
that it exists. Most casual observers have access to what they see as 
happening around them over and above a detailed understanding of its 
comparable historic scale. Despite convincing academic arguments and 
historical precedents that indicate we are not doing anything particularly new, 
there still exists a common belief that the world has changed and we are 
living in some radical epoch, entirely unprecedented in human history. Now 
what I want to do is consider the effect that this change in our world has had 
on our politics and on our way of thinking. If the appearance of change has 
triggered formulations about change then logically change will occur, but what 
happens if the change in question is one away from the dictates of logic? 
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TWO WORLDS COMPARED 
I have already stated that I believe some circumstantial factors contribute to 
the similarity of the theories produced by sophistic and postmodernist 
thinkers. In this chapter I want to examine these circumstances in greater 
depth through comparison. My claim is not a predeterminist one, and I do not 
believe that the thinkers in question are giving a scripted response to a 
recurrent set of social circumstance in the world. What I do think is that there 
are sociological similarities between the now and the then which have led to a 
revival of the older philosophy. This chapter will make an in depth 
consideration of first the domestic, and then the international influences on 
the sophists. I will then go on to compare the factors that might have 
influenced them to similar ones in the modern world (some of which have 
already been mentioned in the previous chapter) with the aim of finding a 
material justification for the conception of relativist critical theory. 
The circumstances of the sophists 
Athens at the time of the sophists was a culturally turbulent community. The 
political climate was volatile because of the affluence that was generated by 
the development of trade agreements and a protective alliance: the Delian 
League of Poleis (also known as the Confederacy of Delos). The League 
was originally formed to fight the Persians but it soon evolved into the 
Athenian Empire and took on cultural and economic aspects. The League 
enabled a great deal of economic, cultural and political exchange within 
Greece and, in the age of Perikles it was arguably the reason that Athens 
became important and powerful. Athens attracted professionals in every 
craft, including professional educators and public speakers; teachers of the 
influential and lawyers, collectively known as wise men or sophists.^"* I 
Coleman, A History of Political Thought: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity (Cornwall: 
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believe that this moment in history exhibited some similar features to those 
present in the late twentieth century. 
What the sophists offered was in great demand but how people felt about 
them was less clear-cut an issue. Even now opinion remains divided, and 
whilst some people view them as having had a liberating effect that allowed 
new forms of social awareness to be recognised, others see them as having 
had a destabilising effect. Part of the reason that Plato was so set against the 
sophists was because they did not accord to the status quo, and however 
right they may have been to question convention they did not contribute to 
future stability. It is ironic that Plato disagreed with them so strongly in this 
respect since he too objected to the enforcement of Athens' traditional 
morality at times. Plato's feelings about Socrates' execution by the 
authorities for corrupting the minds of others with his questioning and atheism 
attest to this fact. Since he was not a traditionalist one must question Plato's 
motivations for opposing sophist revisionism, and the most commonly 
accepted answer to this problem is that Plato valued stability above all other 
political goals. Plato wished to inspire a revolution in moral theory, 'a shift of 
perspective on the whole question of the right way to live.'^^ His objective was 
to discover an enduring formula for political order, stability and rationality, and 
to investigate the conditions under which these qualities might flourish. This 
desire for stability and order was Plato's central motivation as a political 
philosopher. 
What I believe that Plato really objected to was the sophists embrace of 
relativism, which initiated an ultimately un-resolvable debate about the 
founding principles of science and morality. Their belief essentially 
undermined his own philosophical understanding of the world in a way that he 
could never completely counter. It is also quite plausible that he resented 
having to use their techniques in order to present his ideas in Athens, for 
dialectic may be more intellectually valuable than rhetoric but it will always 
lose in a confrontation. Even in Plato's dialogues sophistic tricks can be 
Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981), p.9 
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found and it seems that Socrates cannot refute the sophists that he 
encounters without them, as is exemplified by the use of rhetoric and 
linguistic manipulation between 348 and 351 in Republic, where Thrasymacus 
is duped into agreeing that an immoral person is ignorant and bad when this 
is not what he really thinks.^^ In essence I think that Plato resented the 
sophists because he recognised the value of their work even if he did not 
agree with it. 
Plato's personal opinion about the sophists is unimportant in the context of 
this debate since in fact, his claims that they were a menace to society might 
not have been recognised in his time. The sophists were respected teachers 
of technical skill in oratory and stagecraft, but they were also orators in their 
own right whose influence can be seen throughout Athens. Their public work 
in political debates and in the law courts was very much like the work of 
modern lawyers as is illustrated by John Gilbert's assessment: 
Both sophist and lawyer are well-paid professionals whose cleverness was admired 
even as it is considered suspect, both intellectually and morally. Their influence is 
deplored except when one wants it exercised on one's own behalf. We love them, 
we hate them, we love to hate them.^^ 
The sophists were pillars of the community, and although the authorities took 
action against individuals seen as a menace to society like Socrates, the 
sophists were in a way above such suspicion. 
Whilst sophistic beliefs were a reaction against the science of the 
presocratics, they were also founded in Athenian culture. The influx of new 
ideas from Athens' trading partners had an important effect on how people 
understood the world. There was a certain amount of crossover and merging 
of cultural and intellectual property, as is exemplified by the Babylonian and 
Egyptian mathematics that Athens began using, or the Phoenician skills in 
shipbuilding, navigation and alphabetic writing. Another example is the model 
Plato, Republic, trans. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 450c 
Gilbert, 'The Sophists' in Shields (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p.29 
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of government that Plato borrowed for his thesis about philosopher kings, 
which seems to have utilised the existing theoretical structures of government 
in Sparta. As well as sharing between neighbours, Athens' international 
position allowed the city access to much wider ranging ideas and practices as 
is shown by the influence of Eastern philosophy on Plato's writing, or the 
influence of Jewish monotheism on Xenophanes theology and poetry. This 
all contributes to the persuasive idea that the revolutionary philosophy of the 
sophists may have been the expression of grass-roots radicalism based upon 
access to foreign influences. 
Theory derived from cultural exchange is not an alien concept in the 
contemporary world. Many postmodern breakthroughs can be attributed to 
the observation of others since this allows us to better understand the self. 
More than this, cultural intermingling in the twenty-first century has led to the 
growth of hybrid understandings and structures that incorporate existing ideas 
but exist as something new in their own right. A good example of this 
hybridisation is found in popular culture where artists like Apache Indian make 
their music, "a meeting place where the languages and rhythms of Caribbean, 
North American, and Indian mingle, producing a new and vibrant culture."^^ A 
more contemporary example might be the hip-hop music of Eminem, which is 
a fusion of Black, White and Latino cultural products within the US alone: it 
serves to parody its contemporaries and even itself because it recognises the 
artificial nature of labelling divisions. 
The Delian League 
Much of the wealth and cultural exchange in the fifth century BC was possible 
because of the Delian League, which was established for the professed 
purpose {proskhema) of avenging what the league members had suffered by 
ravaging the territory of the king of Persia. According to P J Rhodes, 
Black, 'The Sounds of the City', Anthropology in Action 1(1): 11-16 (1994), p. 15 
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...at its foundation the Delian League was an alliance of willing members, whose 
autonomy was taken for granted, the objectives of which included the protection of 
Greek states which were already free and the liberation of those which were not, from 
the Persians.^^ 
This surface analysis belies a much more complex and organic arrangement. 
The League did not remain voluntary throughout its existence for instance 
and it was not always directed against Persia (though arguably the League 
became something different when Persia stopped being the enemy). 
Thucydides, the author of much of the history of Athens in this period, 
attempts to explain the shifting nature of the organization by claiming that the 
league might really have been formed in order to satisfy the Athenian desire 
to head up a wealthy, powerful and active alliance. This seems unlikely given 
the wealth of historical evidence that Indicates how Greece was losing its war 
against Persia before the alliance was formed, but it does give a cohesive 
explanation for particularly Athens' behaviour. Retributive justice was a 
pretext for Athens to become Involved with international relations, and more 
importantly, it was the concept that later enabled Athens to enslave the 
Greeks to themselves. In essence, the 'other' of Persia was manipulated 
through propaganda and used to establish domestic dominance. 
This insidious tactic seems quite familiar to the modern audience because it is 
something that we witness in the world around us. Contemporary examples 
of a state using international intervention to justify domestic unification are rife 
and can be seen in the Iraqi, Kosovon and Falklands wars (or interventions) 
since the end of the Cold War alone. Of course the Cold War itself was one 
extended example of this technique of comparable relative scale to the Greek 
war with Persia. Every incident during such a conflict is media managed to 
unite the population against 'the other' despite generally divergent domestic 
and individual interests. The interesting thing about Athens in this period is 
that it used this particular trick more than once: against Persia at first, then 
" Rhodes, The Athenian Empire: New Surveys in the Classics No. 17 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p.22 
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later against Sparta and then a third time against Macedon when forming the 
second Athenian Sea League. The tactic puts me in mind of George OnA/ell's 
Nineteen Eighty Four where "the enemy" changes half way through the book 
showing the reader how unimportant who the actual enemy is as long as 
there is one, or rather so long as there is the perception of one. 
In the late 460s political circumstances changed and Athens switched 
allegiance from Sparta to Argos and Thessaly. This eventually led to war, 
which broke out in 431 when Sparta invaded Attica, hoping to draw out the 
Athenians and crush them outside of the city.^°^ The League, though 
originally founded to fight the Persians, fought under the command of Athens 
during the Peloponnesian War, which raged on and off between 431 and 404. 
The nature of the League was changing, as Athens and her allies fought 
against other Greeks who had an impressive record fighting the Persians, and 
alongside Argos and Thessaly who did not. According to Powell this marked 
"an important step in the development of the League into an Empire."^°^ 
What makes it important for this study is that it shows how powerful and 
cosmopolitan Athens was at the time that the early sophists were writing, 
(which was from around 450 BC). 
Of course Athens lost the war and in 404 Sparta imposed an oligarchic 
regime on the city that ruled for eight months until it was overthrown by 
returning exiles in a counter-coup. This was not the city's first experience of 
oligarchy as it had instated its own between 411 and 410, but it still 
represented a period of turbulence and a break from Athens' tradition of 
demokratica or majority rule (which in itself could be quite unstable). Since 
sophistry spanned until 380, this backdrop of change and conflict must have 
influenced their ideas. The birth and death of the movement seem linked to 
the rise and fall of the Athenian empire, a fall which was incidentally blamed 
on the "long-haired, bleeding-heart, pinko-faggot-hippie-atheist"^°^ Socrates, 
who was tried and found guilty of these crimes. Socrates blamed the sophists 
Rhodes, The Athenian Empire 
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for the demise of Athens in much the same way that many now claim that 
lawyers and litigation culture mark the demise of our world: he thought that 
they took things too far and their selfishness undermined the polls. Honestly, 
although he may have been right, the light of history tells us that the fall of the 
Athenian empire was far more tied to international events than domestic 
ones. 
The sophists were engaged in the business of theorising when Athens was at 
the height of its power and throughout its decline. They were reacting to its 
position as a world leader and its achievement of empire status and perhaps 
more importantly the decline of that status (for it is easiest to criticise a 
society or principle when it has already begun to fail). I do not doubt that their 
theory influenced Athens but I also believe that the rise and fall of the 
Athenian Empire were events dictated largely by international political 
circumstances rather than the result of domestic educators. Sophistic ideas 
and rhetoric were swept up in a tide of material circumstances; they rode a 
historic wave, which I believe must have influenced their content. 
A modern incarnation of Ancient Athens 
Athens had a powerful navy and a defensive plan that allowed them to 
engage in a war that lasted almost three decades, furthermore they had a 
commanding position in world affairs at the head of an international coalition 
and central to global trade. It seems to me that most of the same things can 
now be said about the modern day USA, which has comparable security and 
intervention capabilities that it uses to maintain its extensive interests and 
influence other states, all the time promoting its liberal-capitalist values. 
Ancient Athens deliberately installed democratic governments in foreign 
states to consolidate its own power and the United States now encourages 
(using economic and political rather than military stratagems) what Athens 
once enforced. A direct parallel between Athens and the US exists in the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, the Star Wars II programme, which bears a 
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remarkable resemblance to Athens' Long Walls as a defensive military 
deterrent. 
It is not really surprising that the United States bears some similarities to 
Ancient Athens since classical republican ideals were a foundation concept of 
the American republic. A modified understanding of civic duty and fulfilment 
through rational participation in society, although based largely on Aristotle's 
writing, was also a reference back to the state of Greek poleis in the time 
frame that this essay is considering. Jefferson was the primary advocate of 
importing Greek and Roman ideas and he summed up their values in his 
symbolic 'Yeoman Farmer'. This ideal citizen was autonomous, hard working 
and virtuous; he fulfilled his civic responsibility but did not become a pawn of 
the corrupt government that acted to prevent his self-fulfilment as a man.'°'' 
Proof that the USA was founded on classical principles can be found in 
structures such as the power sharing separated government, which can be 
likened to the Athenian model in design and intent even down to its formula 
for representation under which US Senators originally represented the 
wealthy landowners who were equivalent to voting members of the Athenian 
polls. Also the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the American 
constitution) supports an interpretation of the American founding that 
emphasises civic humanist ideals of equality and autonomy rather than 
liberalist concerns with freedom. Protective laws such as the right to free 
speech or the right to bear arms (the first two amendments) are designed to 
rein in government and allow people to live independently. This and other 
evidence leads Pocock to claim that the founding fathers adapted Aristotelian 
and Machiavellian ideals, through the lens of the contemporary English 
theorist and opposition member James Harrington, to form the basis of their 
society.'*'^ 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (University of North Carolina Press, 
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Perhaps this evidence can lead us to the assertion that the reason that 
sophistry and postmodernism resemble one another is that they are both born 
of similarly founded societies. This however seems too simplistic to me and I 
do not believe that one nation being founded of some ideas of another will 
automatically mean that the two societies have equal global success and 
throw up the same philosophy many years after their respective foundations. 
Besides all else, I am inclined to agree with Kramnick who claimed that, 
"Barlow and his friends, British and American, knew their Aristotle, their 
Machiavelli and their Montisquieu. But they also knew their Locke."^°^ 
Clearly Locke's beliefs played some role in the founding of American politics 
as attested to by the fact that the US has a written constitution, and his liberal 
legacy can be compared to the classical republican one with the hope of 
finding the truth somewhere In the middle. 
Comparative international relations 
If domestic foundation principles are not the key to understanding the 
production of likeminded theorists, then perhaps international relations are. I 
will now look into the global relations of the two demi-empires and how they 
achieved their respective world superpower statuses. In particular I will be 
focussing on what happened to the sovereignty of these nations and those 
around them in their time frames. It seems more than coincidence that two 
world leaders in their own times have produced the same essential political 
and philosophical counter culture, so perhaps the reason for this is the very 
essence of their global power. Just as a by-note before I continue, I will point 
out that although I talk about the US as the birthplace of postmodernism I 
mean this in a cultural rather than a geographic sense, and I acknowledge the 
responsibility of the Western world in general when referring to symbols in 
America. 
Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism (Cornell University Press, 1990) p. 198 
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The sovereign city-state was the basis of the civilised Hellenic world, and no city-
state was ready, if it could help it, to surrender any part of its sovereignty. In the face 
of a common danger, cities might be ready to combine together in a league, each 
parting with some of her sovereign powers to a common federal council but 
preserving the right of secession; and this was the idea of the Confederacy of Delos 
in its initial form.^°'' 
The sentiment expressed in tliis piece of analysis is one that modem nations 
share. They do not surrender their decision-making powers willingly to 
supranational organizations or other states. Britain's relationship with the 
European Union is an example of how reluctantly nation-states surrender 
elements of their sovereignty and how the right to pull out of the organization 
is retained in theory even if in practice this would be highly detrimental. In 
fact in the Athenian context the right to pull out of the organization was 
removed by Athens as protectorate, and attempts to leave were met with 
military force but this was not necessarily the founding concept. 
The European Union makes for a good comparative case study since, like the 
Deiian League, it links geographically and culturally similar states. Both 
organizations acted to impose rules on their member states and were 
simultaneously an investment and a renunciation of national p o w e r . T h e y 
do of course differ in an important way because whilst the league was 
originally a military organization, the EU was founded for economic reasons 
(to stabilise and reconstruct Europe after the devastation of World War II). 
Perhaps this is not too large a difference if one considers economics to be the 
weapon of modern warfare, as is exemplified by America's use of trade 
contracts and embargos for leverage when dealing with international 
situations. Referring to modern political-economics as war by other means is 
not an unfamiliar concept. 
Something my analysis this far has been blind to is that Athens was clearly 
the leader of her alliance and controlled the tributed ships, soldiers and 
Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander: 3'''' Edition (London & Basingstoke: 
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wealth as she saw best. Athens even used the money in the League's 
treasury to build The Parthenon and to fund a series of public works projects 
in Athens when war was less pressing a concern and the only comparative 
abuse of power in relations between nations this century is seen when one 
considers the internal governance of the USSR. Furthermore, Athens forced 
a member state to join the league and recognize Athenian supremacy in 472. 
As Bury puts it, "Carystus was subjugated and made, in spite of herself, a 
member of the league."^°^ This is an example of how the League evolved into 
an empire. The European Union style central political bureaucracies that 
tithed member states and united them behind a common social and foreign 
policy evolved, and was replaced by the dictates of the most powerful state: 
Athens. 
Similarly to the case of Carystus, when the people of the island of Naxos 
decided to withdraw from the union in 468 the Athenian admiral Cimon 
besieged Naxos and forced it back into the league. This shows that although 
the member states were part of an alliance that valued liberty, independence 
and political consent, they were also at war and had to be pragmatic. Geo-
historical and deeply entrenched cultural factors come into the equation when 
dealing with this situation too. We simply cannot look at the Delian League 
from out modern perspective and label it the Athenian Empire because we do 
not totally understand it and realise the culturally specific way that states 
interacted. The union was originally agreed to last until iron floated (i.e. 
forever) and Athens was the state who took upon itself, as the most powerful 
member, the duty of enforcing this and ensuring the alliance's security. 
Cultural sensitivities aside however it must have been apparent at the time 
that Athens was behaving imperialistically and Thucydides' comments 
support this assertion. How willing other nations were to intervene is not 
something we can now clearly know, although the lesson of post 1945 history 
is that other states can be slow to act when imperialism appears gradual. 
'"^ Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander, p.337 
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Then and now 
Nation-states have been the organizing principle of international relations 
since the peace of Westphalia in 1684 but in principle they are not so different 
to poleis. Modern world relations may be conducted on a larger scale than 
that of the Ancient world but the structural principles remain approximately 
consistent. Although I accept that the modern and ancient worlds are very 
different, I do believe that the international situation surrounding ancient 
Athens is mirrored to an extent by the international situation surrounding the 
modern day US. My hypothesis is that the phenomenon of globalization, 
which we have a tendency to view as unique to our time, was as apparent in 
Ancient Greece as it is now. It is still a legitimate and valuable phenomenon 
because we believe that it is unique to our time but it could have been just as 
unique to the citizens of Ancient Athens and this might help to explain the 
similarities I have observed. 
The connection between globalization and the sort of theory that this work is 
discussing is interesting and I will now try to explore it a little more. I believe 
that, as I have stated before, sophistic and postmodernist theory are founded 
on doubt and I further believe that globalization necessarily encourages this 
doubt. The cultural exchange associated with global interconnectedness 
leads individuals to doubt and question their own social norms. The 
exchange associated with globalization is not equal and this has led many 
theorists to claim that cultural imperialism is at work rather than a more 
benign and mutual process. The arguments I find most compelling are those 
that acknowledge the spread of Western ideas and cultural products to the 
rest of the world (the Levi phenomenon) but also take notice of the non-
traditional forms that are becoming more common behind Western cultural 
lines. 
The non-traditional forms that I am referring to are both the directly imported 
foreign ideas, products and processes, and the hybridised ones that can be 
observed too. I will now begin examining in detail the nature of the 
hybridising phenomenon that is globalization and will consider the proof of its 
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existence and its observable effects. If the link between the sophists and the 
postmodernists is to do with a familiar pattern of global change then this may 
allow us to better understand where we are going and may also serve to 
highlight similar ideas through the examination of periods of internationalising 
activity. 
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REALISING THE POSTMODERN 
I have mentioned already that globalization and postmodern theory are linked 
but I now wish to explore this claim in greater depth: specifically I intend to 
answer one question. Could globalization have been a catalyst for the 
postmodern revolution? I have already discussed the intellectual background 
to postmodernism and I still acknowledge its importance, but just as I believe 
material and cultural factors were important for the development of thought in 
Ancient Greece, I believe that real world factors brought together under the 
umbrella term globalization were the midwives of postmodernity. This chapter 
will be concerned with the relationship between globalization and 
postmodernism and if it is able to conclude that postmodernism is the result of 
globalization, then it will lend substance to my claim that the similar 
circumstances of the modern and ancient worlds may have triggered the 
development of similar critical theory. 
The relationship under scrutiny 
Claiming that globalization simply gave rise to postmodernism is like claiming 
that the chicken hatched from the egg: it may (or may not) be true, but it is 
certainly not the whole story. The paradox inherent within the relationship 
between the theory and the phenomenon is that each apparently spawned 
the other. Globalization is as much about creating an open space for ideas 
as a global free-market of commodities and most of what is exchanged is 
symbolic rather than physical because of simple practical limitations (moving 
a trillion dollars in notes, let alone the gold that this currency represents, 
every day across the world is simply not possible). Equally, abstract 
postmodernism is meaningless until physically realised through structures 
such as those associated with globalization. 
It is a commonly held understanding that new technologies such as the 
internet and instantaneous satellite communications (the ITC revolution) 
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facilitated the birth of the contemporary global era. Space-time compression 
and other material consequences of new technologies such as imagined 
communities, the accessibility of world cultures through travel and 
broadcasting mediums, and the natural development of corporatism by way of 
multi- and trans-national companies have led us to call the world global rather 
than any deliberate attempt to implement an ideology. In a sense 
globalization is much larger than anything that could be planned and because 
of this it is wrong to label it simply the result of postmodernism. 
Counter to this idea one can look at the nominal origin dates of 
postmodernism and globalization; the former having been generally agreed 
on as the end of the 1960s, and the latter in the end of the 1980s, and claim 
that the timing fits the idea that the one inspired the other. These dates 
themselves are however not set in stone and I am happy to entertain 
Lyotard's claim that, "transition has been undenway since at least the end of 
the 1950s, which for Europe marks the end of reconstruction."^^° He was 
talking about transition to a postmodern world but he could equally have been 
meaning a global one since both ideological understandings and world politics 
have changed enormously since then. 
Some further proof that globalization has enabled postmodernism is found in 
a topic that I have already covered to some extent in my musings on 
Nietzsche. Since it is not possible for relativism and religious dogmatism to 
coexist, the existence of the former demands the demise of the latter. 
Globalization has arguably played a role in atheising the modern world and in 
doing so has enabled the ideas of postmodern thinkers to become credible. It 
has also arguably played a role in breaking down faith in the structures of pre-
modernity, collapsing the totems of scientific truth and corporatism through 
rigorous journalistic exposition. What globalization and postmodemism react 
against more than the pre-modern though is the modern, and whenever a 
chance to undermine symbols of modernity presents itself that takes 
precedence. 
"° Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1986), p.3 
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Actually there is an interesting relationship between globalization, 
postmodernism and religion. Although some lack of faith is perhaps 
necessary to initiate relativist sentiment, postmodernism does not simply 
represent a rejection of faith. Kieran Flanagan, in his introduction to a 
collection of essays about religion and postmodernity, claims that, 
Postmodernity has given rise to two contradictory movements in religion that are 
difficult to reconcile: first the quest for New Age spirituality; and, second, the 
imperative to rehabilitate tradition in mainstream religions that has given rise to the 
term fundamentalism. Far from confirming an indifference to religious belief, 
postmodernity reveals a search for spiritual differences.^ 
What Flanagan has realised is that the postmodern age is also a postsecular 
one. Whilst modernity encouraged rationalization of belief to the point where 
religion was a fast fading solution, postmodernity now stands for a 
proliferation of choice regarding belief. New Age religious beliefs, rekindled 
dogmas and individualist atheism can and do coexist in the postmodern age, 
and can coexist with the concept of relativism because one answer is not the 
postmodern solution. The proliferation of difference, as encouraged by 
postmodern attitudes and as enabled and enacted by globalization, has 
allowed every individual to engage in "a search for images and symbols 
adequate to our predicament"."^ 
Xenophanes of Colophon was perhaps the first critical theologian and his 
work in the 6**^  Century BC was perhaps as necessary a part in the birth of 
sophistic relativism as was Friedrich Nietzsche's assertion that 'God is dead'. 
Xenophanes claimed that, "Indeed there never has been nor will there ever 
be a man who knows the truth about the gods and all the matters of which I 
speak. For even if one should happen to speak what is the case especially 
well. Still he himself would not know it. But belief occurs in all matters.""^ 
"' Flanagan, 'Introduction', in, Flanagan and Jupp (eds.) Postmodernity, Sociology and Religion 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), p.6 
Seamus Heaney, quoted in Pine, Brian Friel and Ireland's Drama (London: Routledge, 1990), p.l3 
Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 21B34, (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.49.4-
7 Bury) 
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His work was fundamental in breaking down the old structures of mythos, 
which had prevented logos from flourishing. With the way paved however, it 
was not necessary for all subsequent thinkers to be monotheists like 
Xenophanes: breaking the hold that the old religion had on Greek thinkers 
allowed a proliferation of beliefs, including the atheism that Socrates exhibited 
and the belief in relativism that held sway with the sophists. In the 21^* 
Century parallel, Anthony Giddens makes my point for me, claiming that 
although religion fell victim to modernising pressures It did not die off and in 
fact, "for reasons that are to do precisely with the connections between 
modernity and doubt, religion not only refuses to disappear but undergoes a 
resurgence."^ The postmodern world is one where religion plays a role in 
mediating the relationship between self and society, the secularisation of 
modernity no longer holds absolute sway (since postmodernity rejects 
absolutes) and thanks largely to the enabling circumstance of global 
exchange both 'pick and mix' religious beliefs and fundamental ones have 
become a part of the contemporary cultural milieu. 
There is a school of thought which challenges the link that I have so far 
claimed exists between new ways of thinking and a new world that both 
encourages and distributes the new ideas produced. World-systems theory 
analysts, building on the understandings formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein, 
claim that globalization is nothing new and that the increasing intensity of 
cross-border flows simply represents a perfectly conventional stage in the 
integration of the world-economy. In addition to this, the theorists make two 
further claims about globalization that I find most interesting: firstly they claim 
that. 
The globe has long been dominated by a single integrated economic and political 
entity - the modem world-system - which has gradually incorporated all of humanity 
within its grasp. Within this system, all elements have always been interrelated and 
independent. 'National economies' have long been integrated to such an extent that 
their very nature has been dependent on their position within a capitalist world-
economy. The only thing 'new' is an increased awareness of these linkages. 
Similarly, ecological processes have always ignored state boundaries, even if it is 
1 1 4 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 195 
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only recently that growing environmental degradation has finally allowed this fact to 
permeate into public consciousness. 
What is so interesting about this is the fact that Wallerstein and his followers 
believe, as I do, that the international coming together that we see around us 
now is not unprecedented in history or necessarily associated with 
contemporary theory and ideology but rather results from the contemporary 
situation. It also leads on to the second claim that I find interesting, which is 
that globalization itself has become an ideology and it is used as a tool by 
elites within the world-system to justify changes (for instance to how 
companies must operate in order to be competitive or how public money must 
be spent in order to be modern) that ultimately benefit the haves by exploiting 
the have-not's. 
If the sceptical world-systems theorists are correct in their analysis then I 
have been fooled. It is possible that postmodernism and globalism are 
fallacies; 'buzz words' designed to divert people from seeing the truth - that 
we are all wage slaves to the capitalism machine. Marx claimed that religion 
was the opiate of the people but perhaps in the modern secular world the new 
faith is found in idealistic ideas like those being discussed here and the worth 
that they are given is only that with which we imbue them. My problem with 
this idea is that I do not think that the machinery of modernity is unified or 
powerful enough to create such a convincing illusion of a new-era, just as I do 
not believe that governments have the capacity to organise mass cover ups 
as US supermarket tabloids claim that they do, but it does not mean that the 
possibility does not exist and that this is not something worth noting. 
Aside from radical conspiracy theories there are other proofs that the two 
concepts are not as closely linked as I have so far indicated. One of the most 
central ideas of postmodernism is the rejection of metanarrative and it is 
highly sceptical of ideas that attempt to tie together a multiplicity of social 
phenomena and label them. This, somewhat ironically, is exactly what 
Hobden & Jones, "World-Systems Theory' in, Baylis & Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 143 
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globalization does and according to Lyotard's original formulations on the 
postmodern condition, the very idea of trying to tie together a host of world 
events, group them and make a universal theory that relates to them is in the 
spirit of high modernity more than anything else.^^^ Similarly, the concept in 
question (as well as the concept of the concept) is distinctly modern in 
character since it appeals to the idea of progress towards a more united 
world, despite exhibited exemplar of fragmentation, be that good or bad. 
Even more modern than this is the simple assumption that the new world will 
be a democratic liberal capitalist one led by and shaped in the image of the 
USA, a veritable paragon of modernity. 
The proof of whether a link between postmodernity and globalization does 
truly exist may not be something that can be proved here but my hypothesis 
is that they are two sides of the same coin sharing a symbiotic relationship. 
Even more than that, I believe that the postmodern approach of fusing ideas 
might actually be directly derived from the hybridisation associated with the 
idea of a global world rather than merely associated with it. According to my 
understanding postmodernism has resulted from the growth of world 
interconnectedness, and my reason for thinking this is the fact that whilst the 
exchange between postmodernism and globalization might be in both 
directions, the ITC revolution was a real physical enabler of globalization 
unlike any factor that contributed to the birth of postmodernism except 
perhaps the physical applications of that revolution; namely globalisation. 
Essentially what I am saying is that the causes of globalization are more real 
and tangible than the causes of postmodern theory, and because of this I 
think that the former resulted in the latter as an intellectual reflection of reality 
and a theoretical map for the continuation of fragmentation. 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 
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The future for these phenomena 
Postmodern ways of thinking are a coping strategy to deal with the changing 
world according to my understanding and this is never clearer than when one 
focuses on global structures. Nation-states are seen to be failing as they face 
the challenges of the post-Cold War world and despite a continuing trend of 
centralization, sovereignty appears to the public to be crumbling.^ 
Challenges come from within and without, from grass roots groups pressing 
for change, to multinational corporations following through their economic 
agendas. The effect that they are having is to change the existing structures 
of governance (as shown by the simultaneous devolution of decision making 
ability to Wales and Scotland and Investment of power in Europe that the 
United Kingdom has experienced) and as the world around us changes new 
theories must be presented to deal with this. In my interpretation this is not 
so different to what happened when the Athenian empire was realised in the 
5"" Century BC. 
My opinion here runs contrary to that expressed by many commentators on 
postmodernism who see the theory itself as destabilising. Heller and Feher 
claim that postmodernism has undermined rationality and made politics more 
unpredictable.^LePen goes further still and claims that the relativism of 
postmodernity is dangerous as it makes conventional atrocities such as 
genocide simply a matter of taste rather than morally wrong. To my mind 
these reactions echo those of Plato and Socrates who strongly opposed the 
ideas of the sophists who were also advocates of moral relativism in their 
time. Although it is possible that an 'anything goes' philosophy could harm 
society I find the argument that it necessarily does, unconvincing; dealing with 
a changing world requires the degree of intellectual flexibility that 
postmodernism provides (or the firm hand of tyranny to enforce acceptance 
which arguably is provided by high modernity) and as such those who are 
critical of it do not understand the necessarily transitive nature of the theory. 
Whilst unconventionalism may harm existing social structures and 
' " Smart, Postmodernity: Key Ideas 
Heller & Feher, The Postmodern Political Condition 
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understandings, conventional approaches might shatter society as we know 
it, being based as they are on an outdated understanding of the wortd. To 
use a crude analogy, postmodernism represents building walls out of paper 
which seems rather stupid compared to the bricks and mortar of modernity 
until one realises that the post-Cold War worfd is an earthquake zone where 
the flexibility of paper walls has its advantages. 
In identifying world-wide diversity we have fuelled new ways of thinking and 
allowed interested parties to transcend the simplistic mantra of equality, 
replacing it in part with more fashionable contemporary ideas such as that of 
embracing difference. The claim of new-wave sociologists is that recognition 
of wortdwide diversity is not enough and we must seek to integrate this 
diversity."^ Essentially their claim is that we must be more postmodern 
because of and to further facilitate globalization. To my mind this indicates 
that the common perception of a new era comes from a greater 
understanding of the wortd around us and from the realization that 'our way' is 
not the only way. 
Archer, 'Foreword' in, Albrow & King (eds.), Globalization, Knowledge and Society (London-
Sage, 1990) 
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USING THE THEORY 
The intension of this chapter is consider the usefulness of political theory that 
I might be able to asses the usefulness of postmodernity. If even a watertight 
classical theory is inapplicable in the real world, then it is not the fault of 
postmodern theorists that their theory is not exhibited for all to see but it is 
rather the fault of theory itself. I am not doing this in order to be able to 
pronounce a judgement on postmodern political theory, but rather so as to 
allow me to better understand its nature in a context. 
The usefulness of political theory 
The usefulness of political theory is a much debated but little resolved sub 
topic in the field of politics that could on its own be the subject of a 
dissertation or even a thesis. Almost every textbook on philosophy, politics or 
sociology begins by justifying the value of the theorising that it intends to do, 
and this normally entails justifying theory itself to a degree. The following is 
an extract from Barbara Goodwin's textbook's introductory chapter entitled 
'Who Needs Political Theory?' which I feel both proves this point and can be 
used as a starting place for understanding political theory. 
Political theory may be defined as the discipline which aims to explain, justify or 
criticize the disposition of power in society. It delineates the balance of power 
between states, groups and individuals. 
This statement is fairly typical of the attention that is usually given to 
questions about the role of theory: it makes theory sound important and 
practical but does not actually say a lot about what effect (if any) a theory can 
have on the world around us. 
Goodwin, Using Political Ideas: Third Edition (Chichester: Wiley, 1992), p.4 
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The textbook I have quoted continues its introduction to the topic by claiming 
that political theory is a technique of analysis used to overturn or uphold 
existing structures of governance but it does not enlighten the reader as to 
how this occurs. It is one thing to believe that theories can be cited as 
justification or othenwise of the status quo, but it is quite another to claim that 
people can physically change the world by using them in the same way that I 
could physically change my garden using a bulldozer. How exactly theories 
interact with the real wortd is a genuine concern of mine and I would like to 
spend a little time trying to define the link that exists and how it is manifested. 
Is it the case, as Engels asserted, that, "Practice without theory is blind. 
Theory without practice is stenle. Theory becomes a material force as soon 
as it is absorbed by the masses."^^^? If this is the case then how exactly is a 
theory absorbed in this way? 
Something that bothered me about Barbara Goodwin's introductory chapter is 
a contradiction that I found cropped up, and it is a common contradiction 
within theorising about theory. Claims about the functional and specific 
nature of political theory are refuted rather than backed up by the second 
stage validation of theorising which claims that the job of theory is to take an 
abstract, conceptual approach which gives some perspective on events out of 
the context of the mundane (or in other words outside of the context of the 
real wortd). It seems impossible for theory to be both practical and abstract, 
and equally for it to draw generalities from the close study of specifics. 
The solution to this conflict is simpler than one might expect and it is revealed 
through consideration of an issue. The way that political theory works is by 
taking an event, a moment or an issue and examining it in minute detail 
outside of the normal workings of the wortd. This process is comparable to 
the method employed by a film critic who pauses the movie at a point he is 
interested in and then considers the significance and symbolism of the scene; 
he looks at the frozen scene in abstraction and considers it for what it is and 
for what it means in the wider picture of the film. When a political theorist 
Engels, letter to F.A.Sorge, London, Nov.29 1886, in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), p.449 
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wants to consider an event he does so outside of the normal course of affairs 
and once he has analysed it, he uses his understandings of that event (within 
its context) to understand the wider world as far as is applicable. An example 
that shows what I am talking about is the work of Professor Timothy Luke of 
Virginia Tech. Professor Luke isolated an iconic moment of the early twenty-
first century, the September 1l"^ terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, 
and used analysis of this moment to formulate a theory about how the post 
Cold War search for a new enemy has led the Bush administration to frame a 
"new normalcy" around re-branding global terrorism as a foe that warrants a 
perpetual war.^ ^^ 
Political theorists construct understandings of how the world works and how 
the world should work and then label the fruits of their labour ideologies. 
Whilst it is sometimes the case that societies work towards the fulfilment of an 
ideology, for instance some nations strive to be more democratic, it would not 
be natural for a nation-state to choose an ideology and then transform itself to 
match that - change is far more subtle and pragmatic and this once again 
calls into question the role of the political theorist. If all that a theorist does is 
construct a theory around what is going to happen anyway is he really doing 
anything of value? It seems like an unnecessary exercise to claim that we 
now live in a liberal world but there are factions of our society that would 
rather see us living in a socialist one, but the statement can be valuable when 
assumptions are shed and the key terms are explored. 
Precise definitions of terms and in depth scrutiny of meaning are what make 
theory valuable because without these key elements argument, discussion 
and the communication of ideas are impossible. The work of the political 
theorist is to find the limits of very general feelings and make clear the 
inherently fuzzy picture that we share about the world and the future. 
Defining the generalities of human nature within the context of specific 
spheres of society is no easy task and even something relatively simple such 
as understanding the Marxian nuances of second wave feminism as exhibited 
'^ ^ Luke, 'Postmodern Geopolitics in the 21" Century: Lessons from the 9.11.01 Terrorist Attacks' 
rhttp://www.gechs.uci.edu/luke paper.pdH. 04/03/04 
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by contemporary women's movements requires a leap of understanding 
based upon clearly defined ideas. 
Like philosophers, political theorists must start from the foundation of finding 
accurate terms and limitations on what people in general assume they know. 
Once they have these however, theories and the ideologies that can be found 
or made from them can be used to change things. Marxism is a theory that 
radically changed the world, possibly because of its very existence rather 
than the manner of its implementation. If Marx and Engles had never written 
the Communist Manifesto and laid out their radical path to social equality 
would the 1917 revolution in Russia have happened, or the Cold War? The 
Third Reich was the result of the pursuit of an ideological goal too and 
although Adolph Hitler is not often referred to as a political theorist, the 
direction that he was able to lead Germany in was the result of a theory that 
he was able to implement. 
Political theories can be used to restructure society when those who hold 
power chose to apply them though of course it must be noted that the very 
way that they are applied can change the nature of the theory. Before human 
error, corruption, selfishness and personal influences are mentioned as 
causes for a theory to deviate from its design when implemented, there will 
always be internal and external factors that will influence how an idea 
becomes reality: the terrain that the idea settles on and is bounded by will 
clearly influence the shape of the resulting structure. The path from 
conception to implementation is never smooth as is shown by the failure of 
communism, or by the compromised freedom that we now call free-market 
liberalism. This is due to the interconnected nature of the world, the 
whimsical nature of mankind and a multitude of other ever changing reasons 
that no theorist could ever fully conceive let alone factor into a theory. 
Despite the practical limitations just outlined there is still a point to theorising, 
though exactly what that is depends on your approach. Aristotle thought that 
man could only be fulfilled through involvement with politics; in essence he 
believed that people should take responsibility for their world and be involved 
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in the process of improving it and tliemselves. Enlightenment thinkers believe 
that we can never hope to control something that we do not understand and 
imbued with great value the intellectual pursuit of all knowledge, including 
understanding about the tides that mould and remould our socio-economic 
world. Of course due to the nature of postmodernism its theorists must 
disagree with the modernist point of view that political theorising can be used 
progressively but yet if they saw no value in theorising they would invalidate 
their own work so they too use political theory in a different way, as a critical 
tool. 
Political theory and postmodernism 
The clarifative role of political theory is not entirely valid within the 
postmodern sphere of understanding since the movement does not value 
precision as highly as the scientifically concerned modernity. On the flipside 
of that argument however, understanding the differences between similar sub 
divisions of postmodernity is still important due to the individualist and prolific 
nature of the theory. Political theory is ironically a concept which is both 
rejected and embraced by postmodernism: on the one hand postmodernity 
places little value on trying to construct structures or meta-narratives, whilst 
on the other it values defining aspects of itself micro-politically. To 
understand postmodernism fully, the individual must stop attempting to use 
the tools of modernity: political theory as we know it relies on finding formulae 
for an idea and then rationalising and reproducing it in order to serve a 
practical, progressive purpose. The effect that postmodernism has had on 
political theory has been to warp it and change the way that It deals with 
subjects of analysis, making it more passive and expressive. 
Postmodernism is perhaps more accurately described as a moment than a 
theory as it contains no driving essence that can be distilled into an ideology 
and used to direct the course of domestic or world affairs. Postmodernism 
may be a movement that is becoming relevant for sections of our society but 
it is not an ideology that could be adapted for use by a political party or an 
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ideal that could be the foundation of a corporation. Given this statement It Is 
difficult to see how useful the theory actually is, but once again that Is 
because we are viewing It through the tainted lens of nnodernlty and 
assessing its viability rather than appreciating it. Postmodernism cannot be 
understood from the perspective of high modernity (which is infuriating as this 
is our default perspective) so we must think outside of convention and 
consider the theory from a more postmodern point of view, as an organic 
entity that Is still growing and whose final shape is not yet necessarily even 
determined. The danger of leaping to conclusions is made all too clear by 
Janson and Janson who claim that. 
Postmodernism does not try to make the world a better place. In its resolute 
antimodernism, it is socially and politically ambivalent at best, self-contradictory at 
worst. Its operating principle is anarchism, but to the extent that it does offer an 
alternative, Postmodernism espouses any new doctrine as superior to the one it 
seeks to displace. In the end, Postmodernism remains essentially a form of cultural 
activism motivated by intellectual theory, not political causes, to which it is ill-
suited.''' 
The authors go on to say that postmodernism is meaningless because of its 
contradictions but what strikes me about their analysis is that they are missing 
the point. If postmodernism did not contain contradictions and was easily 
understood and applied then it would not be a radical understanding, it would 
simply be another facet of the modernist hegemony, which, being all 
encompassing and so infused with our mindset, is very hard to break from. 
The use of political theory in general is difficult to define but the use of 
postmodernism specifically Is even harder. Postmodernism is not an 
artificially constructed theory like Marxism, or a politically useful one like 
Liberalism, it is rather a representation of a growing number of linked 
phenomena. Theorists can use postmodernism, but not as a call to arms 
against convention or as a goalpost of governance: rather it must be used as 
a tool for better understanding the modern world. To an extent the theory is 
destructively critical and works to tear down the structures of modernity but 
'^ ^ Janson & Janson, A Basic History of Art (New York: Prentice Hall, 1997), p.597 
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despite its potential intent it is not fundamentally effective, perhaps because it 
is not strong enough to challenge the core structures of modernity, or perhaps 
because it is unwilling to seriously harm the world that empowers it. Without 
modernity, postmodernity is meaningless and perhaps the reason that the 
theory lacks political direction is that it is reluctant to end itself, choosing 
rather to seep across society as the ever present reminder that the modernist 
hegemony is not the only mindset available. Essentially there seems to be 
little overarching practical application of postmodern political theory: the 
specifically focussed 'politics of identity' do not constitute this and for them 
ever to attempt to would betray their ideals of rejecting generalization. In all, 
what this seems to show is that postmodernism, in political terms, is a 
transitive tool. I believe that postmodemism is a bridging theory that will lead 
to some new prescriptive macrologically involved theory or ideology, but right 
now we are too close to understand the form that this will take. 
I have already disputed the concept that ideology has ended since I do not 
believe that the postmodern experience is unique, however there is another 
dimension to theorising about this idea that I now want to investigate further. 
It is possible that ideology did not end in the 1990s because it had already 
been dead for some time. 
There almost never was an ideological age in America. The United States in the 
1950s and 1960s is the outgrowth of what Michael Harrington has termed "the 
accidental century"; our contemporary crises are the result of unplanning 
technologically, economically and politically.^^'' 
According to this school of thought, what we have called political theorising in 
the post World War world has had little effect on what actually happens. The 
interconnectedness of the modern world means that realism, rather than 
idealism, is the dominant social force and society is far more pragmatic and 
reactionary than my recent theorising about postmodern political theory 
recognised. 
Waxman (ed.) The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), p.5 
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The relief from ideology that is associated with postmodernity may actually 
also be a feature of modernity and in a way this is not a surprise. I have 
claimed already that postmodemism is meaningless in isolation since it fulfils 
the role of high modernity's rebellious child, so is it that strange that the two 
entities share a related ideological makeup? The ideas of modernism and 
postmodernism may be fundamentally opposed but the world in which they 
must operate is one and the same. It is a practical world where actions 
provoke reactions and simple biological needs rule supreme over lofty ideals. 
Marx claimed that before a man can aspire to politics he must be concerned 
with providing food and shelter for himself and his family and this 
understanding of the world is far more realistic than Plato's idea that man can 
live the best life on philosophy alone. Theorising about the postmodern may 
be different from theorising about anything in the modern framework but the 
world still continues to enforce the same rules of life regardless of the epoch 
that we seek to create an understanding of. 
Given this realization, does postmodernity really matter and how can it be 
used constructively in everyday life? The answer can be found in practical 
exemplar. Baudrillard claimed that the media could create a "hyperreality" 
which would lead us to understand ambiguous events as something far more 
concrete. The example that he used was the first Gulf War where the 
hyperreality of war on a tyrant obscured other realities such as the 
exploitation perpetrated by Kuwait's oligarchy and the interests of the nations 
who committed troops to fight the war.^^^ The very appearance of normality 
in the world, or the perception that the world is changing are perhaps further 
hyperrealities that require some analysis. Every piece of news that gets 
reported has a bias and not all worthy news even gets that far; the individual 
must be vigilant and not simply accept every hyperreality that is offered 
without question. Events must be scrutinised, the liberal democratic world 
that we appear to live in demands it, and postmodernism is a valuable tool for 
achieving this: one that should not be discounted because of its radical 
nature. Indeed this empowers it because capitalism is a self-justifying system 
Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. Patton (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995) 
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and those who want to change the world (for instance those on the political 
left, or fundamentalists) can only do so by analysing events outside of the rule 
structure of the capitalist paradigm. 
Continuing this trend of thought, perhaps postmodern analysis can help us 
understand why we believe that a new era is upon us. Baudrillard shared the 
sophistic understanding that all we have is perception and that what people 
perceive can be influenced, essentially meaning that what is true for them can 
be manipulated. The existence of the perception that the world is changing 
attests to this phenomenon regarding the nature of existence. We see the 
wortd changing because we believe we are seeing the world changing. Now 
although the sophists could manipulate the understandings of reality within 
individuals subjected to their rhetoric it would be quite ludicrous to suggest 
than the realization of a perception of change (intended to eventually bring 
change) is due to the influence of a small group of individuals now. Instead it 
seems that the understanding that we share about the world is evolving 
naturally and the role of postmodernity is to help people understand and 
come to terms with that natural evolution. 
As individuals accept postmodernity they empower it, and it seems that 
education (or rather re-education) about the horrors of high modernity such as 
the greed of capitalism, the inhumane hand of the market and the iron cage of 
bureaucracy might spell the end of the modern world. Realization of the 
suppressed reality of negative modernity is leading people to imagine that the 
world is changing because that seems like the logical step; and in turn, 
because the reality that we exist in is only what we imagine, we are in fact 
changing our world. What postmodernism does for the individual is restore 
some degree of individual autonomy and encourage rebellion. It is ironic that 
postmodernism encourages dissent from the era that educated the individuals 
who believe in it and encouraged them to be original and entrepreneurial, but 
then perhaps that is the contradiction of modernity; that it will destroy itself 
because of, rather than in spite of, its self sustaining progressive nature. 
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No era lasts forever and it is natural that world systems evolve and change, 
even despite the structures that humanity insists on constantly assembling. 
Every empire falls eventually and every age must have an end, just as it has 
a beginning. The fall of modernity looms on the horizon, and as 
postmodernism runs its course the world stage is being readied for the new 
world order, though what that could possibly be is as yet unclear. It should be 
noted that postmodernism does not seek out this change, the theory is 
deliberately non-progressive, but if the cycle is to continue something must 
come beyond anarchic individualistic gratification and deconstruction. 
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THE CONNECTION TO SOMETHING LARGER 
Every work is part of something beyond its own bounds. I now want to talk 
about the implications of what I have said here and I will do this in two veins. 
Firstly I will consider the hypothesis that if postmodernism is a response to 
globalization, as I have shown it may be, then could it be the case that all 
political theories are formulated in response to political realities? I will discuss 
this fundamental question with passing reference to several thinkers who 
have professed to understand the true nature of political theory. My argument 
here will be based around Marxian and Aristotelian analysis, which I believe 
supports my case. Secondly I will look at where postmodernism goes from 
here. I will speculate about what the future of the theory, and the practice of 
relativism are likely to entail, again with reference to those who have studied 
this field before me. In both sections I hope to find an intellectual formulation 
that sits consistently with everything I understand about the political theory 
that I have detailed throughout this work. 
Political theory and reality 
Karl Marx claimed, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point [of philosophy], however, is to change it."^ ^® He 
believed that intellectuals were remote from reality, but that this was not how 
things should be. His theory, following this assertion, was deliberately 
responsive to the issues that people faced in the real world because he 
respected man's need for survival above lofty political ideals. Throughout 
Marxian work, class struggle is (or should be) the primary issue that should 
concern the majority of people, and the reason that this should be so is 
because of material needs. There may be enough resources in the world to 
satisfy everyone's basic survival needs, but the capitalist system works to 
divide those who own and those who do not, ever intensifying the gap 
' " Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach' (1845), in, Marx and Engels Selected Works, volume 1, trans. Lough 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 15 
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between rich and poor, between the bourgeoisies and the proletariat. 
Communism as an ideology is born of material concerns; it is an intellectual 
solution that is necessary because of the perceived social crisis that Marx and 
Engels saw as inevitable. 
The Marxian base-superstructure metaphor can be applied to the process of 
theorising, as was best put by Marx himself when he stated that, "It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, 
their social existence that determines their consciousness."^^'' My 
interpretation on this idea is that lofty goals, ideas and ideologies must be 
conceived and enacted by individuals who are subject to the real world first 
and their own imaginations second. Political theory and action are 
reactionary tools responding to actual, perceived, or potential situations and 
problems. A political theory may be pre-emptive and preventative but only if 
the problem that it is averting or solving has already been foreseen or 
predicted. Spontaneous independent theory does not exist, and if it did it 
would not be political! 
I think that what Marx happened upon, by no means exclusively, was a 
fundamental rule governing how ideas and reality are connected. His 
understanding of the relationship may be the understanding that we most 
commonly have access to now, but it actually derives from an Aristotelian 
idea. Aristotle claimed, in response to Plato's claim that Philo-Sophia (the 
love and pursuit of pure wisdom) was the most noble and worthwhile activity 
available to man, that the pursuit of knowledge should be tempered by the 
base, but still important, needs of man. Aristotle famously claimed that 'man 
cannot live on bread alone' but he also recognised that man could not live 
without it. 
Aristotle's politics is particularly interesting in this context because he actually 
had an ultimate reason for linking political aspirations with reality. He 
believed that 'Nature does nothing in vain', and so consequently, by following 
Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Moore and Aveling (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1970-2), preface 
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the natural path one reaches the best possible conclusion. Aristotle 
employed a teleological approach to understanding the way of the world, 
believing that every type of thing and being has its own particular perfect 
natural end or good, its telos. The natural course is that this end or purpose 
will be achieved, meaning that the thing is good. The way to realize potential 
and fulfil purpose is through a specific type of work {ergon), which is indicated 
by the features {dynamis) of one's class of being. A duck, for instance, has 
webbed feet in order to swim, and according to teleological analysis; the 
observable feature, that the duck's feet are webbed, implies that it can 
achieve its 'good' of being able to swim well through the work of swimming. 
Man's function is determined by his nature: he has a mind and the capacity 
for reason so his purpose is to best use it. 
Man's telos is to achieve eudaimonia, which is often rather inaccurately 
translated as happiness, but means something more like success; a source of 
happy feelings. "To be eudaimon is to flourish, to make a success of life"^^^ 
rather than to simply be euphoric, and it involves an element of metaphysical 
completion. The important part of this philosophy in the context of this work, 
is that the fulfilment of the potential of the spirit or mind should not come at 
the expense of physical fulfilment however, as excellence in all human 
faculties makes man most complete. Of course, achieving excellence in 
every aspect of human life is not an easy goal to accomplish, and Aristotle is 
clear when he asserts that it cannot be achieved in isolation. He believed that 
"Men are not isolated individuals, and the human excellences cannot be 
practiced by solitary hermits."^^° In other words, to be complete, men must 
live and work together, and the optimal arrangement of this according to 
Aristotle was the polls. In short what Aristotle believed was that the 
achievement of lofty ends must be accomplished through mundane activity. 
Citizenship was the path to fulfilment for him and understanding this came 
from observing nature and reality. Marx saw political theory derived from 
political reality. Aristotle saw yet another level; he saw political reality derived 
Barnes, Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
Barnes, Aristotle, p.78 
Barnes, Aristotle, p.79 
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from nature, an ultimate source that was perhaps even part of a divine grand 
design. 
Turning to a more contemporary outlook that supports my assertion I want to 
look at the apparent lack of political theory in a twenty year period of the 
twentieth century. If political theory can be nullified by historic circumstance 
then it must be the case that it is responsive to, or even derived from, the real 
wortd rather than a separate pool of ideas and inspirations that people can 
access through cerebral exploration. Stephen White, editor of the journal 
Political r/7eo/y explains the lack of political theory between the 1950s when it 
was pronounced 'dead' by Peter Laslett and the revival in the 1970s in the 
introduction to What is Political Theory? He does so with reference to several 
political realities of the period, namely "...trying to comprehend fully the 
horrors of Nazism, while pondering with growing terror a future of potential 
global nuclear destruction."^^^ White is paraphrasing Laslett and justifying 
why political theory was inadequate due to an international situation. In wider 
terms what his reasoning shows, if it holds true, is that political theory is 
reliant on certain political realities. This may seem an obvious statement, but 
it reminds us that our ability to reflect on "political and social relationships at 
the widest possible level of generality" relies upon us having "evidence of the 
contemporary social and political situation"^^^. In other words, to produce a 
theory through reflection we must have something to reflect on, and what we 
produce will reflect, like a mirror at a carnival distorted by original insights and 
interpretations, what we started with. 
What does this mean in relation to the claims that I have made throughout 
this work? First and foremost I stand by my analysis of two equivalent time 
periods that I believe have produced two similar political theories and 
realities. I think that the reason for the similarity of theory is the similarity (or 
rather equivalence) of the two political realities. The notion that ideas are 
reflections of realities, supports, and is supported by, my theory about how 
White, 'Pluralism, Platitudes, and Paradoxes: Western Political Thought at the Beginning of a New 
Century', in, White and Moon (eds.) What is Political Theory? (London: Sage, 2004), p.l 
'^ ^ Laslett, Philosophy, Politics and Society, 1" series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), p.vii 
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relativism is reborn. Individuals leave their mark on theories and systems but 
they are a small cog in the machine that governs the relationship between 
theory and reality. Furthermore, the notion that theory is born of reality on an 
essential level supports an understanding of postmodernism offered up by 
Heller and Feher that I have found useful throughout my research. Theory is 
influenced by the circumstances of its foundation so it is of no little 
significance that, "As a social theory, postmodernism was born in 1968. In a 
manner of speaking, postmodernism was the creation of the alienation 
generation disillusioned with its own perception of the world."^^^ 
Developed postmodernism 
Postmodernism is a young theory, one that is only now starting to be 
understood and applied, or perhaps more accurately one whose applications 
around us are just starting to be understood. If it is only now coming of age 
then it is interesting to speculate on what it will look like when it reaches 
maturity. The comparison between the equivalent circumstances of Ancient 
Greece and the modern world that I have championed throughout this work 
points toward one idea as I see it. The idea is that our epoch is a transitory 
one; what we do politically now is part of the build up to something else, 
something radical and new that as yet we cannot see. Like masons chipping 
away at a block of stone we are headed toward an Aristotelian finished 
product, a product (or in our case, a politics) that we will only know when it is 
complete. 
My evidence for this assertion is historic but it is supported by contemporary 
analysis of the postmodern problem (or the aftermath of the postmodern 
solution to the modem problem!). In ancient Greece the ideas of the 
sophists reigned supreme in the period between when the presocratic 
scientists formulated their flawed understandings of the world, and when 
Plato's disenchantment with contemporary Athenian polities was eventually 
'^ ^ Heller and Feher, The Postmodern Political Condition, p. 138 
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recognised to have worth. Their era was between when science failed the 
people and when a new moral education saved them. It seems to me that a 
political reality cannot be sustained for long on the basis of relativism and 
doubt, since by the end of Aristotle's life philosophers with positive theories 
were once again more recognised as important to the polis, as is evident from 
the role that Aristotle himself played in framing the Athenian constitution and 
establishing his school, the Lyceum. Did positivism truly dispel relativism? I 
don't think so, but what I do see is relativism having played its role and wiped 
the slate clean of unsupported falsehoods. 
What we are heading towards could well be what Hegel would have called a 
"differential unity", a place where the various threads of historical 
development come together in a rich, mathematical, poetic and almost pre-
determined way. The new era of politics may be one that combines the best 
elements of modern and postmodern theory and reality: combining modern 
solidarity, alliances, consensus, universal rights, macropolitics and 
institutional struggle with postmodern difference, plurality, 
multiperspectiv'alism, identity, and micropolitics. Perhaps what comes after 
the postmodern era is a time and a mindset that organizes itself along lines 
that combine the unity of modernity with the extreme forms and fragmentation 
of postmodernity, though it is hard to see such a compromise as anything less 
than a victory for modernity. 
According to Best and Kellner, "one of the main dramas of our time will be 
which road we choose to travel into the future, the road that leads, in Martin 
Luther King's phrasing, to community, or the one that verges toward chaos... 
the one that establishes social justice, or ever grosser forms of inequality and 
poverty?"^^"* I do not agree with this polar choice between the values of 
modernity and those of postmodernity since the picture is far richer that. Why 
not a return to an older set of values or ascend to a newer one? Compromise 
between the two camps of the contemporary ideological world might not be 
possible but that is not to say that these are the only two options available. 
Best and Kellner, Dawns, Twilights, and Transitions: Postmodern Theories, Politics, and 
Challenges [http://www.democracvnature.org/dn/vol7/best kellner postmodernism.html 28/06/04 
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I have mentioned already that postmodernism is a transitive state and that I 
think something new will replace it, just as the climate in Ancient Athens that 
allowed the sophists to flourish eventually changed. Relativism may be 
unsupportable in the long term but the problem with it is that it is also near 
irrefutable. Postmodernism is more than pure relativism, it encourages 
religious beliefs for instance, from the alternative, to the traditional and even 
the fanatical. Although without some fundamental proof, relativism can never 
fully be dispelled, postmodernism might well be shaken by events, since as a 
theory produced by theorists whose context is the world around them. This is 
the importance of the relationship between theory and reality. I think the 
claim premature and sensationalist, but none the less I acknowledge Julia 
Keller's assertion that the terror attacks of September 1l"^ mark the end of 
postmodernism and the death of relativism because the acts showed the 
world that there are moral a b s o l u t e s . E v e n t s in the real world will be what 
end the reign of postmodernism, either directly, or through influencing the 
next generation of theorists. The threat of postmodernist relativism and 
critical rejectionism to social order will recede when the context is right, and 
they will leave a legacy of scepticism which will be slow to fade. 
I am not so naive as to claim that the new era will be the last. That is a 
mistake that has been made too many times throughout history, but I do think 
that it will be something worthy of being called a new era. "It could seem as if 
progress has led us to the brink of an abyss, and that it is therefore necessary 
to consider alternatives to it. For example, to stop where we are, or else, if 
this should be possible, to return."^^^ Leo Strauss' rationalist point is a good 
one, the perceived failure of modernity does call us to consider an alternative 
to the standard progression of history, but even more than this, the 
postmodern way is to reject the simple structure of answers that he provides. 
The lesson of postmodernism is to embrace opportunity and options, to think 
Fish, 'Can Postmodernists Condemn Terrorism? Don't Blame Relativism', The Communitarian 
Network, vol. 12:3 (2002) 
Strauss, 'Progress or Return', in Pangle, The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An 
introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
p.227 
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outside of the box and that has to be what the new era will be built upon. I 
am not saying that the twenty-first century (or even the twenty-second 
century) will be based on anarchic alternativism, but that it will be founded 
from unconventional principles. If political theory echoes political reality, the 
theorists dreaming up the path of tomorrow will be doing so today, they will be 
experiencing the conflicted contemporary (global) world where modernity and 
postmodernity clash on every street corner, and their vision will be a reaction 
to or a reflection of what they know. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have been looking forward to writing this chapter since I first started this 
work because it represents the essay I wanted to write from the start, from 
before I had to justify my claims or account for anomalies. It is not however 
the same essay that I would have written a year ago. Over the course of my 
investigation I have needed to revise my ideas about postmodernism and its 
relationship with the world: I now realise how complex a relationship it is. I 
also realise some of the problems with thinking of postmodernism as unique, 
or with thinking of it as anything other than unique. 
According to some theorists, signs of postmodernism are all around us in the 
contemporary world. Times have changed and we have entered a new era, 
one presided over by a new intellectual consensus (or perhaps a lack of 
consensus) based loosely around embracing difference. This new era was 
not heralded by the winning of a war, or a spectacular and observable event: 
rather it was a gradual reaction to the hegemony of modernity. The 
postmodern era stands for everything that the modern era opposed, placing 
importance on breaking from contextual truths that serve only to perpetuate 
modernity. The new phase in the development of mankind is ironically not 
one that believes in the notion of development or is perpetually concerned 
with progression. 
This golden image of postmodernism is not what I see when I look at the 
world around me. The fable of postmodernism is so prevalent and persuasive 
that it is easy to accept over and above what rigorous study tells us is the 
case about the phenomenon that is postmodernism. The world we live in 
though, is highly structured and regulated for the most part, and countless 
proofs exist that we are most definitely still experiencing high modernity: 
corporatism, for instance, has not collapsed in the face of a thousand 
alternatives. Postmodernism is something that exists at the periphery of our 
world understanding, and although it may be of growing importance it is not 
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even faithful to the theory itself to claim that it could become the mindset that 
everyone embraces in the future. 
Postmodernism is riddled with conflicts that according to conventional 
understandings will be the seeds of its undoing: how, for instance, can it 
thrive when essentially its aim is the end of modernity but at the same time it 
is itself a by-product of modernity that is meaningless in isolation? Perhaps 
the problem here is that we, as observers and analysts, employ logic and the 
analytical tools of modernity to try to understand a movement so radically 
removed from the modern. One of the first things that we have to recognise 
about postmodernism to study it, is that it is different, even revolutionary, and 
as such it is not subject to some of the rules we take for granted. The 
problem when engaging in this study is that not every tool of understanding 
that we possess is as flawed as we are led to believe. Rigorous study of 
specific elements of theory and practice reveals some interesting similarities 
between high modernity and postmodernity. One big similarity that cannot 
help being the cause of many more, is that the two eras occupy the same 
space and time for the most part and a context must influence the form that 
any theory subject to it takes. 
For this discussion to be meaningful (from a conventional perspective at 
least) some goals must be set. What I intend to do is present the key 
features of postmodernism and explain why they are important. I will recap 
my exploration of the role of the theory/movement/phenomenon as well as its 
nature in order to hopefully give it a meaningful context. When doing this, an 
important focus will be the question 'is postmodernism really revolutionary?' 
since that concern was central in my mind when framing this work. I do not 
want to repeat my assertions and analysis of the main body of this work, but I 
will draw attention to things of importance that I have discovered and 
revealed. The aim will be to combine all of my research and, without over 
simplifying things, give my individual verdict on postmodernism by combining 
the perspectives I have explored. 
I l l 
Pinpointing the birth of postmodernism is difficult, but because of the 
influence that reality has on theory it is important to understand the social 
mood that inspired this revolution. It is inaccurate to assert that 
postmodernism literally came after modernism, because the two share a 
symbiotic relationship. Like moss growing on the underside of a rock, 
postmodernism may have come into existence as soon as modernism did, but 
even if this is true, it is still problematic for when precisely did the world 
become 'modern'? Perhaps modernity took hold after the high industrial age 
at the turn of the century, but I find terming the 1900s as 'modern' does not sit 
well, and I think this is because the point at which the Western world was 
specifically remodelled as modern was when it was reconstructed in the wake 
of the second world war. In the 1960s the message of radical resistance to 
the status quo was shouted loud and clear by the youth of America at the 
same time as the early European postmodern theorists began expressing 
their ideas. To my mind this shows that postmodernism was not born with 
modernity, but born of it, evolving as a countercultural response to the 
ovenA/helming success of the modern project. The alternativism of the hippies 
was a response to a social context, the distribution of their iconic statements 
and imagery were the result of technological development, and the theories of 
early postmodern thinkers were founded on the work of their intellectual 
predecessors (both contemporary and historic). Regardless of these enabling 
circumstances the significance of the period cannot be ignored. Without 
becoming blinkered to instances of postmodern thinking before this period, 
generally it seems that the postmodern age can be narrowed down to the last 
half a century or so and this period is what I have based my study of 
postmodernism on. 
In general terms postmodernism appears as a loosely bound collection of 
ideas that reject established understandings. Postmodernism is not a school, 
a collection of thinkers brought together by a single unifying understanding or 
method and with a single goal or argument, since the association between 
postmodern ideas is at best a loose one. What it is, is a post-conventional 
alliance of ideas, an antithesis of our subjective understanding of truth, a 
broad catch all endeavour and a nightmare to define with conventional 
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theoretical terms. Goals, tenets, methods and contexts are hugely varied and 
sometimes of incomparable levels of sophistication, but on some fundamental 
philosophical level, relativism is important to the genre. Not every 
postmodernist makes relativist claims, but in seeking alternative truths, 
postmodernists revive a fundamental philosophic issue that has evaded clear 
resolution since its conception. Relativism has cropped up time and again in 
the history of ideas in a somewhat cyclic nature and its importance within the 
field of postmodernism only serves to highlight the field's worth, and status as 
more than just a fad. 
To understand relativism one must return to the birthplace of Western 
philosophy. Ancient Greece. Before Socrates, Plato and Aristotle there were 
scientists, the Milesians, who made claims about the nature of the world that 
were insightful and new, filling the growing void of understanding left in the 
wake of a declining religion, but were also fundamentally flawed. The pre-
science of the Milesians lacked falsifyability: their theories could not be tested 
or refuted and because of this there was no reason why the ideas of one 
thinker were more 'true' than the ideas of another. Thinkers like Parmenides 
and Zeno paved the intellectual path to relativism in a reasoned, logical way, 
but the sophists really breathed life into it. Like postmodern thinkers do now, 
the sophists lived their alternative understanding and used it as their moral 
compass. The four sophists that I have spent time explaining in depth in the 
body of this work, Protagoras, Gorgias, Thrasymachus and Callicles, did not 
share an identical understanding of what it meant to be a relativist, but this did 
not matter; the agenda of using dialectic to distil contributory ideas into a 
single understanding (to rationalise) was irrelevant to them. To reject the 
concept of a single truly correct answer is to embrace a multitude of solutions, 
even ones that contradict one another. It is also, to understand that 
perception (image) is all-important and being a relativism means redefining 
ones conception of worth radically. 
The sophists had a profound impact on their society, they were teachers, not 
of their ideas specifically but of their techniques. They also however were 
clearly a product of the world around them. Through the crystallized lens of 
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history we can see the theories that the sophists were reacting against and 
how they utilised the intellectual outputs of the philosophers who were their 
contemporaries. We can also see how the changing nature of their world 
must have played a part in the conclusions that they and others drew. The 
historic circumstances surrounding the birth of relativism were, put simply, the 
rise and fall of the Athenian Empire. This involved major changes to the 
political map (backed up by military action), an economic and technological 
golden age resulting from new trading opportunities and an intellectual 
renaissance inspired by cultural exchange. Although looking at the world 
around us it is difficult to observe the influences on postmodern thinkers 
because of the fluidity of events, utilising this historic model for the birth of 
relativism helps us to understand its rebirth. If nothing else, the 
circumstances surrounding the sophists indicate to us places we should look 
for influences on postmodernism. 
Postmodern thought, like sophist thought, has been influenced by the work of 
other theorists: Kant, Marx, Nietzsche and hundreds of other thinkers, 
although not postmodernists themselves, can certainly be seen to have 
played a role in the formation of postmodern ideas. There are necessary 
intellectual stepping-stones on the path to relativism that analysis of Ancient 
Greece revealed to us long ago, and application to the present reveals again. 
Similarly there are events and trends in the real world that influenced ancient 
thought and have, to an extent, recurred in the late twentieth century. 
Globalization is the single most significant apparent change to international 
relations perhaps this century, but certainly since the end of the Cold War. It 
may be the case that globalization is in actuality nothing new, but it appears 
real and that is significant. The impression that the world is changing as a 
result of technological advances has had an impact on political thought, 
inspiring an impression of the world as a shared social space and a place of 
free cultural exchange. Postmodernism and globalisation share a link, they 
both seem to play a role in influencing the other and their existences are 
equally doubted due to their radical and intangible natures. 
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The problem with treating the postmodern as a revolution is that like 
globalization it may simply be nothing new. An individual in possession of 
complete account of the history of international relations could simply 
conclude that the scale or rate of increased international exchange witnessed 
in the late twentieth century is unremarkable. Levels of world 
interconnectedness are high, but within a context they are not necessarily out 
of place mathematically speaking. Similarly, an individual who was well 
versed in historic political theory could easily pick out strands of (supposedly 
revolutionary) postmodern thought that were lifted directly, either consciously 
or othenwise, from other thinkers' works. The global and intellectual 
revolution birthed in the twilight of the twentieth century seems to me to be a 
fallacy, a trick of the light that has inspired people to name and perpetuate the 
phenomena. I think that postmodernism plays a role, and that role may be 
one that leads (or even requires) people to think it Is revolutionary, but the 
role is documented in history and part of a process larger than the individuals 
who believe in it. 
Postmodernism is critical and deconstructionist, it is a theory that reveals 
falsehoods for what they are rather than showing us truths or answers. In 
terms of political theory postmodernism has no strategy for achieving any 
ideological goal. Practically, even if the world has radically changed it would 
be problematic to label this change a postmodern revolution because no part 
of postmodernism has demanded or inspired an uprising. Perhaps one might 
argue that a postmodern revolution Is different to a modern or conventional 
revolution, and rather than being represented by rioting in the streets it is 
expressed more subtly and to the end of splintering political institutions and 
belief structures rather than overturning them. To my mind this is like saying 
that a postmodern apple is different to a modern apple because of its inedible 
skin, its citric taste and its bright orange colour. Postmodernism may reject 
old assumptions but it must conform to some extent with the definitive 
language of modernity or it becomes meaningless and this is really the crux of 
why one cannot claim that there has been a revolution. 
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How important is postmodernism? It would be nice if there were a simple 
formula for working out the value for any theory, but this is not an easy 
question to answer if one holds back from embracing epistemological nihilism. 
It is tempting to take a postmodern approach to this question and say that 
postmodernism is as worthless as anything else we believe. I think if that 
sentiment were truly at the heart of postmodernism I might just have to agree 
that it is worthless, but in reality the theory does not just give up like that. 
Postmodernism is a sceptical, critical, doubting theory that seems at first just 
to be concerned with pulling down the structures of modernity but there is 
more to it than this, and as a theory founded in pluralism it embraces 'the 
alternative'. Postmodernists step outside of the boundaries of high modernity 
and find their own individual solutions to how they should live in alternative 
cultural and intellectual frameworks: why should individuals who have the 
power of free choice and access to any idea they want not shake off 
geographical and temporal restrictions and experience shared or individual 
social worlds outside of the dominant one? High modernity inspires 
postmodernism and postmodernism in turn has its niche in the contemporary 
world, a world that I believe is now no longer adequately defined as either 
modern or postmodern. 
My thesis is that postmodernism is not the new or unique phenomenon that 
being caught up in its influence can sometimes lead us to believe it is. To 
quote what was once the ultimate source, 
What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing 
new under the sun. Is there anything of which one can say, "Look! This is something 
new"? It was here already, long ago^ '^^  
It is poetic that once again I can cite the ancient to explain the contemporary, 
but given that the recycling of words and theories characterises the 
postmodern condition it is not out of place. By exploring the postmodern from 
a historic perspective one can see that the ideas are not original, and by 
studying the context of postmodernity, both intellectual and material (or socio-
Ecclesiastes, 1:9, Holy Bible: New International Version (1973) 
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cultural) one can understand it as a reasonable and valuable theory. The 
critical value of postmodernism is clear, but it is also valuable as a coping 
strategy to deal with escalating problems of modernity such as the impression 
of nihilistic disempowerment and radical global societal change. Relativism 
and alternativism are important concepts in the world today, it takes nothing 
away from them that they have been documented as occurring before, or that 
they are explainable with reference to the events and theories that surround 
them. Postmodernism may not be as revolutionary as it first appears, but it is 
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